



Report:

**No Lost Generation: A Catalyst for Action &
A Foundation for Fulfilling the Rights of Children Affected by Crises**
(LRPS No. 9140589)



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Disclaimer

The views presented in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the No Lost Generation Initiative.

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Abbreviations & Acronyms

3RP	Regional Refugee and Resilience Response Plan	INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
AAP	Accountability to Affected Population	IOM	International Organisation for Migration
ALNAP	Active Learning Network on Accountability and Performance	ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ATF	Advocacy Task Force	LNGO	Local Non-Governmental Organisation
CCC's	Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action	M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
CHF	Common Humanitarian Fund	MEHE	Ministry of Education and Higher Education (Lebanon)
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency	MEL	Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning
CO	Country Office	MIN	Ministry
CRC	The Convention of the Rights of the Child	MoE	Ministry of Education
CP	Child Protection	MOPAN	Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network
D&A Report	Data and Analysis Report	NFI	Non-food Item
DAC	Development Assistance Committee	NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency	NLG	No Lost Generation
DCF	Discounted Cash Flows	OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
DFID	United Kingdom's Department for International Development	ODI	The Overseas Development Institute
DG ECHO	European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations	OECD	The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
EBITDA	Earnings before interest, taxation, depreciation, and amortisation	OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
EC	European Commission	OPT	Occupied Palestinian Territories
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council	PAP	Provincial Action Plans (Turkey)
EU	European Union	RACE	Lebanon's Reaching All Children with Education Plan
EQ	Evaluation Question	RCT	Randomized Control Trials
FAO	The Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations	SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
GAP	UNICEF's Gender Action Plan	SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
GBV	Gender Based Violence	SHARP	Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan
GEROS	Global Evaluation Reports Oversight System	SIDA	Sweden International Development Agency
GoE	Government of Egypt	ToR	Terms of Reference
GoI	Government of Iraq	TP	Temporary Protection
GoJ	Government of Jordan	TPM	Third Party Monitoring (Monitors)
GoL	Government of Lebanon	UN	United Nations
GoS	Government of Syria	UNCT	United Nations Country Team
GoT	Government of Turkey	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator	UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team	UNESCO	The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
HQ	Headquarters	UNHCR	The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
HRBA	Human Rights Based Approach	UNICEF	United Nations Children Fund
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan	UNRWA	United Nations Relief Works Agency
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee	WASH	Water, sanitation and hygiene
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross	WFP	World Food Program
ICT	Information and Communication Technologies	WHO	World Health Organization
IEG	Independent Evaluation Group (World Bank)	WHS	World Humanitarian Summit
IMS	Information Management System	WoS	Whole of Syria
INEE	International Network for Education in Emergencies		

1 Executive Summary

1. The Syrian conflict has caused one of the worst humanitarian disasters in modern times with an unprecedented loss of life and an increasingly long-term impact on the safety and stability of the region. The refugee crisis is the largest in 20 years with more than 5 million people seeking refuge in neighbouring countries.
2. Launched in October 2013, the No Lost Generation initiative (NLG)¹ was initially a “strategy” to focus resources on ensuring that children affected by the crises in Syria, and later Iraq, had access to “education, protection, and opportunities to engage positively in their community and society.” The NLG Strategic Overview from 2014 established three programmatic areas:
 - Providing children with access to learning opportunities (education);
 - Providing children with access to a protective environment (child protection); and
 - Providing children and adolescents with initiatives to broaden their opportunities (youth engagement, amongst others).
3. The NLG was intended, initially, to be incorporated into relevant sectors/clusters and to thus not be a stand-alone initiative at all. As noted elsewhere, this first “strategy” also did not include an explicit focus on youth and adolescents.
4. In October 2015, the NLG produced a Concept Note, “No Lost Generation: The Next Phase.” This was developed by all NLG partners at the time and established new directions for the NLG, including a focus on continued advocacy, the NLG as a knowledge sharing platform, and a clarification that it was these efforts, rather than a direct focus on programming, that would define the NLG going forward. This was also when the third pillar on youth and adolescent programming was formalised.
5. This Concept Note was the result of the combined efforts of all NLG partners and a recognition that the NLG could do more than advocacy for resource mobilisation. It was also a recognition of the constraints associated with incorporating the NLG into the sectors/clusters, as originally envisioned. While this shift was not always clear to all, as addressed throughout this evaluation, it did signal a new phase for the NLG from 2016 onwards.
6. By 2018, the NLG had set out a workplan and performance monitoring matrix with four objectives:
 - Positive and lasting changes for children and young people in No Lost Generation countries are supported as a result of regional-level strategic efforts to influence decision-makers towards No Lost Generation advocacy objectives. (advocacy)
 - The funding level for programmes under No Lost Generation pillars in each of the six No Lost Generation countries is at least 60% of appeal target. (fundraising / accountability)
 - The voices of children and youth in No Lost Generation countries are raised at all levels through communications and participation in high level events. (ensuring the voices of children and young people are heard at all levels.)
 - Country level practitioners in No Lost Generation programme areas have access to relevant resources and are guided by strategic frameworks for cross sector programmes, emerging programme areas and innovations (knowledge management; facilitation of partnerships and other support for cross-sector programming, emerging programme areas and innovation including technology)
7. This evaluation demonstrates that while the NLG was highly effective as a “clarion call” for the rights and needs of children affected by the crises, once this was accepted and incorporated, to different degrees, in regional response plans (3RP; SHARP; et. al.), these became the primary drivers for action in response to the crisis. The NLG’s initial message, while still largely recognised as important, was complicated by the increasing volatility of the crisis, with a new crisis emerging in Iraq in 2015, and as the level of long-term destruction inside Syria continued. It was complicated further as development strategies emerged in host countries, especially in Jordan,

¹ While the “No Lost Generation” is, in and of itself, the key message, the words used for its ensuing activities and programme of work have included “strategy,” as described in this section, “programme,” “platform for sharing knowledge,” “advocacy platform,” and “initiative”. The most common since 2016 has been “initiative” and this is the one most used in this report. In all other cases, “NLG” is abbreviated to imply the “No Lost Generation initiative” throughout the rest of this report.

- Lebanon, and Turkey, to which international donors and humanitarian and development actors aligned their activities.
8. The decreased resonance of the NLG as a “clarion call” does not imply that the NLG did not continue to have an effect on resource mobilisation and a focus on integrated programming. As noted, the NLG included an increased focus on “youth and adolescents” in 2017, with it as one of the “three NLG pillars.” This contributed to a 6.9% increase in funding for youth and adolescent programming in 2018, from US\$355.1 million to US\$379.5, while other sectors saw decreases in funding over the same time period.²
 9. The NLG also continued to collect data and information that highlighted the needs of children. This data covered discrete “output” level needs as culled from regional and country level response plans, providing better disaggregation along child protection, education, and later, youth and adolescent programming.
 10. After 2016, the NLG expanded the number of partners and affiliates, in line with the October 2018 Concept Note, and began conducting events that covered issues related to cross-sector programmes, including adolescents and youth. (See Section 3.2.2.) While these were effective, the NLG tended to conflate these types of activities with output level results and funding levels in NLG annual reports and other documents--results that were largely beyond its control.
 11. While it is understandable that the NLG would promote these results, by doing so it may have confused actors as to the NLG’s overall purpose and prompted some to dismiss it as “duplicative.” There were lingering interpretations of the NLG as an initiative solely for resource mobilisation and programming results, despite the clear shift in 2016 to a partnership and knowledge sharing platform. This potential confusion, unfortunately, led to less understanding and knowledge of how the NLG was evolving and the continued contributions it was making to children, youth, and adolescents.
 12. This confusion about the NLG’s initial purpose and how that purpose evolved may have obfuscated how the NLG initiative became a unique model that combines advocacy, knowledge sharing, and an “incubator” approach to cross-sector and cross-organisational issues that nearly all recognise as important for results. In fact, the NLG stands as fairly unique in being a regional platform for promoting the rights of the child through integrated programming approaches. If, as recommended in this evaluation, it also starts to collect and track outcome level results--how integrated approaches deliver better and more sustainable results--it has the potential to have a significant influence on how programmes are designed and funded.
 13. This proposed approach will enable the NLG to identify specific examples of how cross-sector, integrated approaches, deliver results under which conditions and as related to how different actors work together. It will show how, for example, how UN and INGOs work together to achieve results and the roles that government and civil society may play in this. It can also be a catalyst for affected populations, bringing in the voices of youth and adolescents in ways that move beyond tokenism and towards the inclusion of affected populations in better designs, better implementation, and better results reporting.
 14. The NLG can identify persistent operational challenges that cut across actors and contexts and conduct “innovation workshops” that bring together traditional and non-traditional actors, like the private sector actors included in the NLG Tech Summit, to come up with viable solutions. These solutions could then be piloted and/or brought to scale by NLG partners and, because of the focus on proven and practical integrated programming solutions, donors may be more inclined to fund these. This could be significantly different from other cross-sectorial groups that tend to focus on coordination and knowledge sharing. This envisions the NLG as a “think tank” that develops specific operational solutions for issues that impede performance.
 15. Such a role was not foreseen for the NLG. It evolved from being a powerful message that influenced local and international actors to being an alliance of committed organisations and individuals working at the regional level to continue to promote the three pillars, integrated programming approaches, innovative approaches to recurring issues, as well as continuing to be an advocacy platform for resource mobilisation. Despite some confusion about its overall purpose, the NLG developed exceptional assets in how it brought actors together to determine how best to meet the needs of children, youth, and adolescents, affected by crisis.
 16. Urgent needs remain. These not only concern the immense needs of children, youth, and adolescents, in relation to access to quality education and a protective environment for their development, but how these are achieved through a more holistic, integrated, and effective approaches. This includes how humanitarians deliver on the

² “NLG documentation: Annex 4: Budget Analysis of A&Y Tagged Projects for Syria HRP.”

rights set out in the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and other fundamental human-rights based approaches. This is the basis on which the “No Lost Generation” was formed. As UNICEF’s Executive Director stated in relation to the NLG: “Helping the children of Syria is investing in the future of Syria, as today’s children are tomorrow’s doctors, teachers, lawyers and leaders. Investing in this generation is helping them acquire the skills and knowledge they will need to rebuild their communities when peace returns. We need to heal their hearts and minds. And there is so much more to be done.”³

17. There is still a lot to be done. By building on the NLG’s assets and competitive advantages, it can create a driving force for how to meet the needs of children, youths, and adolescents in relation to the Syria and Iraq crises and serve as a model for other humanitarian responses.

1.1 A Summary of Conclusions

Relevance

- The NLG is fully aligned with the rights of children and young people and this should be its driving focus going forward.
- The NLG consistently identified gaps in funding and needs to relevant actors throughout the response. By 2016, it was integral to regional (3RP) and country level (SHARP) response plans.
- If the NLG focuses on its core message of avoiding a “lost generation,” and activities, research, and analysis on the outcomes associated with a “whole child” approach, amongst other activities, it can certainly serve other humanitarian responses.

Effectiveness

- The NLG influenced funding levels, especially earlier in the response and in relation to youth and adolescent programming later in the response. This was the case in host countries where funding levels in education, particularly, grew to unprecedented levels but less so inside Syria where education was not prioritised and where funding for total requirements remained low in comparison to 3RP countries. Nonetheless, the level of funding for education, child protection, and youth and adolescent programming in relation to the Syria and Iraq crises is largely unprecedented.
- The NLG never had the mechanisms to directly influence the scope or quality of programming and so its influence there was minimal. In fact, it was originally intended to be incorporated into the sectors/clusters— something that did not materialise. While efforts after 2016 and in relation to the October 2015 Concept Note were received well, there was no way to link these with operational strategies and plans at the country level.
- The NLG’s influence on policy and legal frameworks have been understandably minimal.
- The NLG should continue to foster partnerships across a broad array of actors while clarifying its role as an advocacy platform for resource mobilisation (primarily), focusing on outcome level results, and conducting “innovation workshops” on performance issues that impede integrated approaches to the “whole child.”
- While the NLG is aligned with the rights of the child (CRC), it could do more to incorporate gender equality and women’s empowerment as integral to effective child protection, education, and youth and adolescent programming.

Efficiency

- The NLG operating model was first meant to be integrated into existing coordination structures and then, in phase two and as based on the October 2015 Concept Note, it developed as a partnership and knowledge sharing platform. These made sense at the time, but the second operating model could be strengthened going forward.
- The NLG must have a realistic and focused purpose to ensure that any and all resources are used efficiently. At the same time, the NLG Secretariat and UNICEF’s role have been instrumental to the NLG’s success.

³ “Sustaining the commitment to preventing a lost generation of Syrian children.” UNICEF Press Release; 24 September 2014.

- The NLG is valuable as a regional forum that brings organisations together around the issues of children’s, youth’s, and adolescents’ needs and rights.
- The NLG’s influence and value are most aligned with advocacy, e.g. the ability to influence tipping points that create a significant change in policy and programme direction, coalition building, shaping policy agendas, influencing attitudes and behaviours, and building social movements.
- The NLG could start to compare the cost of developing various solutions, using the costs of the Tech Summit to date as a baseline/standard, and compare this to the relative value/results of their implementation by different organisations.
- The NLG did not have significant contributions to country level programming, nor should it be expected to do so. The NLG should avoid being seen as a regional “coordination” mechanism as some respondents indicated.

Platform for Sharing Knowledge

- While some think of the NLG as a “coordination mechanism,” the NLG was never meant to be coordination mechanism and so it adds little value as such. In its best sense, it is an advocacy platform with the potential to promote emerging best practices in relation to integrated child protection, education, and youth and adolescent programming.
- The NLG performs a distinct role in promoting and advancing how integrated approaches to child protection, education, and youth and adolescent programming deliver better outcome level results and in identifying best/emerging practices on how to do this.
- The NLG should still draw from and add to other regional and international forums related to education, child protection, and youth and adolescent programming, although its role should be considered distinct from these.

Connectedness

- The NLG is aligned at an output level with UNICEF’s Gender Action Plan (GAP). It can be strengthened by using the GAP as a model for an outcome-level results framework that shows how and why integrated approaches provide better results than they do alone.
- The NLG is, in essence, an approach that takes into account the short- and long-term needs of children. However, it was never positioned to have a direct bearing on how different responses transitioned along the humanitarian-development nexus.

Impact

- The combination of the impact the NLG has had in relation to the Syria and Iraq crises--as a catalyst early on, as a reminder of international commitments thereafter, and as a galvanising force for regional and international actors committed to the rights of the child, all with considerable good will and commitment--should not be underestimated.

1.2 A Summary of Recommendations

The evaluation includes the recommendation listed below. These are described throughout the report and expanded upon in Section 5.

Relevance

1. Develop a model for the NLG that builds on its partnerships, highlights outcome level results, identifies best/emerging practices associated with integrated programming, and uses its existing competencies and competitive advantages as a regional forum to develop innovative solutions to cross-sector, cross-organisation operational problems related to integrated programming. (EQ 1.4; Section 3.1.2.)

Effectiveness

2. Create partnership tiers with an expanded secretariat/working group, semi-annual partnership meetings, and an annual event to showcase NLG results and to give a platform for youths and adolescents. (EQ 2.2; Section 3.2.2.)

Efficiency

3. The NLG should continue to function as a secretariat and working group. It may consider opening this to qualified local NGOs and other local actors. The NLG should continue to include the UN agencies primarily responsible for coordinating the humanitarian response, e.g. both UNHCR and OCHA. (EQ 3.1; Section 3.3.1.)
4. A revised operating model and focus should be supported through predictable funding for 3 – 5 years. (EQ 3.1; Section 3.3.1.)
5. The NLG initiative needs to focus on identifying issues concerning integrated approaches that are appearing across country contexts and by multiple partners. (EQ 3.5; Section 3.3.5.)

Platform for Sharing Knowledge

6. The NLG should continue to invest in the No Lost Generation initiative website to highlight outcome level results—something current HRPs do not adequately address--and as a repository of knowledge for the region and for other humanitarian contexts. (EQ 4.2; Section 3.4.1.)

Connectedness

7. The NLG may make reference to output level results across the pillars, as is done currently, but should expand upon these to identify and disseminate outcome level results that highlight emerging or best practices in relation to child protection, education, and youth and adolescent programming, and how different organisations work together on these. (EQ 5.1; Section 3.5.1.)

2 Methodology

This section provides an overview of the methodology. For more, please consult the evaluation’s Inception Phase Report, available as a separate Annex.

18. The purpose of this independent evaluation, the first of the No Lost Generation (NLG) initiative, is to explore how, if, and to what extent the NLG *influenced* different actors towards more and better education, child protection, and youth and adolescent programming, as a response to the Syria crisis. The evaluation has done this through an assessment of different aspects of the NLG, including its relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, potential impact, sustainability, and role as a platform for sharing knowledge.⁴ The evaluation includes conclusions and recommendations that may be considered for the NLG’s next phase.
19. The Evaluation’s scope includes the time period from inception (October 2013) to the beginning of the Evaluation (November 2018), as well as activities at global, regional, and country levels, including Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt and Turkey. The Evaluation team conducted field visits to Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey.
20. The primary stakeholders for the Evaluation are the NLG partners. In essence, the NLG stands as a platform that serves these partners and other organizations who have been involved in the Syria and Iraq responses. The final audience for the Evaluation will also be NLG partners and others involved in the Syria and Iraq responses.
21. The Evaluation did not encounter any debilitating limitations although some questions, like those related to return on investment, were not answered fully given the lack of available evidence.

2.1 Architecture and Theory of Change

The Evaluation was based on a traditional sequence, starting with a theory and progressing to analysis:




Figure 1: Evaluation architecture

22. This begins with the theory which in turn informs the theory of change. The theory of change establishes the links between inputs, outputs/activities, and expected outcomes and impact. This includes particular attention to the NLG’s “sphere of influence” and the intervening variables that affected the NLG’s influence on different parties at different times.
23. The Evaluation Team formulated a series of evaluation questions based on preliminary questions in the ToR and the resulting theory of change, which are addressed throughout the evaluation.
24. The analytical framework, data collection tools, and analytical tools, described in the *Inception Phase Report*, established the ways in which these questions were answered.

2.2 Sources

25. The following sources were used as primary data for this evaluation’s analysis and reporting. Qualitative data was collected during the three field missions to Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey.

Qualitative Data

80 semi-structured interviews were conducted as follows:

Cohort	Number of Interviews	% of Cohort Interviews
UN	45	56%
- UNICEF	27	33%
- Non-UNICEF	18	23%

⁴ These conform with OECD/DAC evaluation criteria and the United Nations Evaluation Group’s (UNEG) norms and standards.

INGO	17	21%
Donor	13	16%
LNGO	3	4%
Ministries (MIN)	2	3%
Totals:	80	

Cohort	Number of Interviews	% of Cohort Interviews
Regional	22	28%
Egypt	3	4%
Iraq	2	3%
Jordan	17	21%
Lebanon	21	25%
Turkey	15	19%
Totals:	80	

26. The total number of stakeholders included for possible semi-structured interviews was 203. 80 represents a 39% sample overall. As indicated in the table above, 33% of respondents were from UNICEF, representing a large sample. This is aligned with the total number of UNICEF stakeholders included for possible interviews, 62 or 31% of the total. While representative, this was still considered by the evaluation team in relation to qualitative-evidence trends.
27. Of the 80 semi-structured interviews, 66 were used for qualitative evidence. Some were not used because respondents did not have substantive comments on the issues. Some were not used due to the nature or confidentiality of the subject or interviewee. In any case, these result in **1,264 qualitative data points for ranking. This is approximately 19 per interview.** DARA’s benchmark is 20 per interview, and therefore, this is sufficient representation given the number of qualitative questions. Informed respondents, those who have deeper experience or more detailed responses, are represented by more qualitative data points. In this way, expertise is captured without the risk of respondent/interviewer biases.
28. Interviews used standard protocols, as included in the *Inception Phase Report*, with the possibility to ask additional questions relevant to the respondent. All questions are linked to specific Evaluation Questions (EQs) for the evaluation. Qualitative evidence is described in the next section.

Survey

29. A survey was administered during face-to-face interviews to the majority of interviewees, depending upon time and relevance, with **64 respondents (82.5% of total interviewees)**. This provides a discrete data set that was compared with qualitative data trends. The protocol for this survey is included in the *Annexes*.

2.3 Notes on Qualitative Evidence

30. **Qualitative data is based upon summaries of what people said, using verbatim statements as relevant and possible.** These are organised according to specific Evaluation Questions (EQs). Some were further analysed and divided into additional EQs as part of the analysis for the final Report. The EQs conform to OECD DAC and ALNAP criteria for humanitarian responses.
31. **Qualitative data is based upon the perceptions of respondents at the time of the interviews.** This implies that their responses may be influenced by what is going on at the time of the interview and may draw more heavily on examples from the recent past.
32. **Qualitative evidence is inherently messy.** Sometimes people say things that are seemingly un-related to the question. These are included from time to time and ranked according to the context and perceived intent of the respondent. Some data points are repeated when multiple respondents state the same thing and when they apply to different EQs.
33. **Qualitative data points are ranked according to being a positive, neutral or negative statement.** The original interviewer ranks the respondent’s statement, which the Team Leader then reviews. People could arrive at different rankings for these statements. However, they do reflect the evaluation team’s insights and awareness of the general intent of each respondent during the interviews. **This is the first stage of analysis.**

34. **Contextual analysis is conducted** to identify common themes and subjects and trends overall. Word frequency graphs are sometimes used to further indicate trends. Subsequently, this evidence is compared with survey data, and further assessed through documentary and relevant subject matter expertise, thus triangulating information from various data sources. Findings are based upon all data sets and their strength, or the correspondence between data sets.

2.4 Using Qualitative Data Graphs

35. Qualitative analysis graphs, used throughout this report, demonstrate trends by categorising responses according to a set scale and organising them according to specific EQs and cohorts. Each respondent statement (data point) is evaluated according to the following scale:

■ - Positive; achieved expected results ■ - Neutral; Mixed results ■ - Negative; did not achieve expected results

36. These rankings are subjective. They are based on the statement as confirmed by respondents and on their overall intent. Others may reasonably arrive at different rankings. Every attempt has been made to preserve each respondent’s anonymity although confidentiality cannot be assured.

37. These data points are then analysed to establish trends across different subjects, e.g. education, child protection, or youth and adolescent programming, or by different cohorts, e.g. UNICEF, NGOs, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, or others. As the sample figure below illustrates, trends can then be compared, showing “negative” comments in red, “neutral” comments in amber, and “positive” comments in green. This example shows the results of the key informant survey across all subjects, e.g. an average ranking of 3.6 on a 5.0 scale. This is provided as a comparative data set and included in qualitative trend analysis graphs as relevant.




Figure 2: Example of qualitative trend analysis graph. THIS IS NOT BASED ON THE NLG BUT IS PROVIDED AS A SAMPLE.

2.5 Data Synthesis & Triangulation

38. As described in the *Inception Phase Report*, conclusions include a graphic that corresponds to the congruence or divergence between qualitative/survey data (Q) from the evaluation, primary and secondary documentary evidence (D), and the subject matter expertise of the evaluation team (S). This provides a shorthand of how and if all data sources were used. These are summarized as being either Grey (no data), Amber (some data), or Green (sufficient data). Examples of this include:



This example shows that there is some documentary evidence and sufficient levels of qualitative/survey and subject matter expertise to support the conclusion.



This example shows that there is some documentary evidence, sufficient levels of subject matter expertise, and no qualitative data to support the conclusion.

3 Findings & Conclusions⁵

3.1 Relevance

3.1.1 How aligned are the stated or apparent intentions of the NLG with the human rights of children and young people affected by the Syria and Iraq crises? (EQ 1.1)

39. The basis of the NLG in its early phase was to focus resources on ensuring that children and young people affected by the crisis in Syria and Iraq had access to “education, protection, and opportunities to engage positively in their community and society.”⁶ The NLG Strategic Overview for October 2013 – December 2014 established three programmatic areas:
- Providing children with access to learning opportunities (education);
 - Providing children with access to a protective environment (child protection); and
 - Providing children and adolescents with initiatives to broaden their opportunities (youth engagement).⁷
40. This addressed the escalating and nearly unprecedented needs of children and young people affected by the Syria crisis, initially, and the Iraq crisis after 2016.
41. The integration of education, child protection, youth and adolescent programming, was based on the recognition that these were all integral to the rights of children and young people. The Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC) sets out the civil, political, economic, social, health, and cultural rights of children.⁸ In addition to articles regarding the protection of children, defined as anyone under the age of 18, Articles 28 & 29 address education. Article 28 focuses on access to all levels of education, including making “primary education compulsory and available free to all.” Article 29 focuses on the development of the child, linking education to how children may become productive members of society: “The preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society, in the spirit of understanding, peace, tolerance, equality of sexes, and friendship among all peoples, ethnic, national and religious groups and persons of indigenous origin.” The 54 articles in the CRC provide a foundation for dignity, development, and protection of children to which signatory state parties commit.⁹
42. In other words, the CRC must be taken as a whole, recognising that protection, development, education, the right to information, and the “preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society,” are all interlinked.



43. Conclusion: The NLG is fully aligned with the rights of children and young people and this should be its driving focus going forward.

44. This evaluation recognises the complications of how the CRC, and similar human rights treaties, are manifest in different contexts and for different people and how far actors must go to fulfil the promise of such treaties. Nonetheless, the NLG is fundamentally linked to the CRC, recognising that education or child protection or the needs of adolescents and youth should not be treated separately but instead as an integrated approach to the basic rights of children affected by crises. While the CRC covers areas that go beyond education and child protection, these are fundamental to how children can become productive members of their families, communities, and societies. This is what was going to be potentially “lost” in relation to the Syria crisis and so, from its outset, the NLG put these rights at the centre of the response.

⁵ These are organised according to the evaluation levels and questions agreed upon during the Inception Phase. This section includes both findings and conclusions to facilitate the reader’s analysis. Not all questions include specific conclusions, either because of the relevance of the answers to broader themes or because of a lack of evidence. Conclusions are repeated in the section immediately after this one. Issues of sustainability are addressed by the Evaluation’s conclusions and recommendations.

⁶ “Terms of Reference for Service Contracting (ToR) for the Evaluation of the No Lost Generation (NLG) Initiative. LRPS No. 9140589 Annex B” UNICEF; Section 1.

⁷ IBID.

⁸ “Convention on the Rights of the Child.” Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989 entry into force 2 September 1990, in accordance with article 49.

⁹ The CRC provides a comprehensive view, recognising rights related to children’s protection and to the integrity of being part of a family but also rights of children to “freedom of thought, conscience, and religion” (Article 14) and to have “access to information and material from a diversity of national and international sources, especially those aimed at the promotion of his or her [sic] social, spiritual and moral well-being and physical and mental health” (Article 17), amongst others.

3.1.2 To what extent did the NLG identify gaps to relevant actors at different times in the response? (EQ 1.2)

45. The NLG consistently identified gaps, results, and challenges associated with education, child protection, and, albeit later, youth and adolescent programming. Each NLG annual report, cited throughout this evaluation, dedicated considerable attention to these, with summaries for each country. This analysis also became integral, drawing from and adding to, the 3RP, SHARP, and other response plans and appeals. Respondents to this Evaluation confirm this.




Figure 3: To what extent did the NLG identify gaps to relevant actors at different times in the response? (organisational cohorts)




Figure 4: To what extent did the NLG identify gaps to relevant actors at different times in the response? (geographic cohorts)

46. In analysing these qualitative data trends, the majority see the NLG as a catalyst for identifying gaps, especially in the early years of the Syria crisis.¹⁰ Jordan was the least positive amongst geographic cohorts. Here, respondents state that the Jordan Response Plan (JRP) and the concentration of activities in the camps necessitated a different approach than that encapsulated by the NLG. Respondents in Turkey were positive and yet, here, the size and relative sophistication of the Turkish government, and its immediate response to refugees, was aligned with the government’s overall approach and, thus, also with the NLG.

¹⁰ Qualitative analysis graphs include “government” as distinct cohort, despite the small sample size of government respondents, 3% overall. This is included as these respondents form a distinct constituency whose views were analyzed along with government plans and strategies.

47. Some feel that, once there was broad consensus amongst humanitarian actors that education, particularly, should be an essential element in the response, the attention created by the NLG became subsumed by the broader response plans and developments in each country affected by the crisis. (See Section 3.2.1.)
48. This “broad consensus” was not immediate. The “2014 Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan” (SHARP) does cite the need for education, stating:
- Nearly 2.3 million children have stopped attending school in Syria and the situation is similar in refugee-hosting countries. Currently, over 60 per cent of the 735,000 school-age refugee children are not enrolled in school. The obstacles to education and the accumulated loss of school years are jeopardizing a whole generation of Syrian children.¹¹
49. The strategic objectives set forth in the 2014 SHARP focus less on education when compared with refugee host country responses. The SHARP objectives focused on protection, life-saving services, rehabilitation, stabilisation of livelihoods, and preparedness.¹² Education requirements were a fifth overall and only 4.5% of total requirements, after food and agriculture (49% of requirements), NFIs & Shelter (19%), health (10%), and WASH (7%). The only education success noted from the previous year concerned a joint UNICEF/Ministry of Education “Back to Learning” campaign. The 2014 SHARP does include a section on the “No Lost Generation Strategy.” While this section notes that needs for education and protection “are increasing exponentially, due to the massive surge in the number of out of school children over the past year,”¹³ these needs are not reflected in the subsequent requirements.
50. Beyond Syria, the “2015 – 2016 Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan (3RP)” shifts the focus to include social cohesion efforts and the “resilience and stabilization needs of impacted and vulnerable communities in all sectors; build the capacities of national and sub-national service delivery systems; strengthen the ability of governments to lead the crisis response; and provide the strategic, technical and policy support to advance national responses.”¹⁴ A focus on essential needs across sectors, social cohesion, and government leadership in the response continued to be the focus in subsequent regional plans. Only by the “2017 – 2018 Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan,” did the NLG become a primary strategic imperative, emphasising all three NLG pillars, including strategies for strengthening opportunities for adolescents and youth.¹⁵
51. These broad regional planning shifts occurred alongside country level strategies, like Lebanon’s Reaching All Children with Education (RACE) plan, first enacted in September 2015, with RACE II establishing a more articulated strategy for 2017 – 2021; the Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis 2016 – 2018 (JRP) that cites education and social protection as the two largest requirements amongst 12 sectors;¹⁶ or the Government of Turkey’s response to the arrival of refugees from Syria through the “6458: Law on Foreigners and International Protection,” that defined a Temporary Protection (TP) regime for the Syrian refugees and enabled, through this law, the integration of refugees from Syria into the Turkish education system, community-based education programmes for accelerated learning, and additional assistance through temporary education centres.¹⁷ Egypt, Iraq, and the other countries affected by the crisis were also served by the 3RP and other country-level planning and response activities that recognised education as a critical need.



52. Conclusion: The NLG consistently identified gaps in funding and needs to relevant actors during the response. By 2016, it was integral to regional (3RP) and country level (SHARP) response plans.

53. While the role of the NLG as a “message” changed as other regional and country level plans shifted their focus to escalating needs (See Section 3.2.1), including those of education and child protection, it

¹¹ “2014 Syria Regional Response Plan.” UNHCR; 2014. Page 24.

¹² “Syrian Arab Republic Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan 2014.” Various; OCHA; 2014. Page 4.

¹³ IBID. Page 9.

¹⁴ “2015 – 2016 Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan for 2015 – 2016.” UNHCR & UNDP. 2015. Page 8.

¹⁵ “2017 – 2018 Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan.” UNHCR & UNDP. 2017. Pages 20, 21.

¹⁶ “Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis 2016-2018.” Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan; Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation. September 2015. Page 12.

¹⁷ According to a World Bank study on the issue, “The Turkish approach to school provision for Syrians under Temporary Protection has taken three main forms: (i) integrating Syrian children into the Turkish education system; (ii) allowing community based education (CBE) programs run from within the Syrian community; there is a range of curriculum used in these CBEs, with the most popular being the Libyan curriculum and religious education (Refugee Studies Centre, 2014); and (iii) facilitating Syrian children to attend SuTP-designated temporary education centers (TECs), which are supervised by the Ministry of Education (MoNE).” “Turkey’s Response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis and the Road Ahead.” World Bank, December 2015. Page 7.

consistently cited the needs, gaps, successes, and challenges present regionally and in each affected country. Respondents recognise the value of this information and the NLG became integral to these plans over time.

3.1.3 How far are the stated or apparent intentions of the NLG initiative aligned with partners' strategic objectives? (EQ 1.3)

54. While this Evaluation cannot fairly assess how NLG partners' strategic objectives developed, they were largely aligned with the response's broader strategic objectives, whether articulated in each iteration of the 3RP, the SHARP, or in the Iraq response plans. These plans, in turn, were influenced by, at different times and to different degrees, by the NLG. For a broader analysis of this alignment, see Section 3.2.1.

3.1.4 How relevant is the NLG initiative to other humanitarian responses? Is there a model that could be used in other responses? (EQ 1.4)¹⁸

55. The Syria crisis is unprecedented in the scale, pace, and complexity of humanitarian response. It included an array of response mechanisms and actors that grappled with the huge scale of needs. There were also vastly different country level responses, from a near immediate integration of children into schools in Turkey, to the RACE plans in Lebanon, to Jordan's Response Plan and the focus of humanitarian action on refugee camps there, to the ongoing conflicts in Iraq, and to the devastation of infrastructure and services in Syria.

56. The countries that host refugees from Syria are middle income countries, with relatively sophisticated governments and populations that have largely valued education historically. (See Section 3.2.4) International actors have worked with them in various ways to put the needs of children at the forefront of the response.




Figure 5: How relevant is the NLG initiative to other humanitarian responses? Is there a model that could be used in other responses? (Qualitative evidence; organisational cohorts)

57. The NLG is different by focusing on operational issues and the voices of youth and adolescents towards integrated approaches to education, child protection, and youth and adolescent programming. While there are other bodies that also do this, the NLG has led in activities and events that are based on “overlooked” or particularly difficult issues while developing solutions, and sometimes innovative solutions—to these issues. This would seem relevant to most humanitarian responses.

58. While not quite a majority, respondents agree that the NLG is a model for other humanitarian responses. At the same



Figure 6: How relevant is the NLG initiative to other humanitarian responses? Is there a model that could be used in other responses? (Qualitative evidence; geographic cohorts)

¹⁸ This section also answers the Evaluation question 7.3: “Could other locations/countries/regions benefit from an extension, replication, or modification of NLG, and if so, what are proposed modalities for doing so?”

time, respondents also cite that this focus would have been central to the response regardless of the NLG. They state that the run-up to the World Humanitarian Summit, the Sustainable Development Goals, and the growing research about education and child protection, particularly, predated the NLG. (See Section 3.4.2 for more on these and other international efforts.) Donors were also sceptical of the NLG as a model for other responses, stating that it depends on the context and the priorities of different donor countries. Yet, these respondents, as across issues assessed in this evaluation, tend to focus on education, rather than how education, child protection, and youth and adolescent programming coalesce to effectively meet the needs of children, youth, and adolescents.



59. Conclusion: The NLG stands as a model for an integrated approach to the needs of all children in a humanitarian response and as aligned with the CRC. As the NLG focuses on its core message of avoiding a “lost generation,” and activities, research, and analysis on the outcomes associated with this “whole child” approach, amongst other activities, it can certainly serve other humanitarian responses.

60. The NLG galvanised humanitarian actors, and especially donors earlier in the response, to focus on education, child protection, and youth and adolescent programming throughout a humanitarian response. In some contexts, this included a focus on one or more of the pillars, like education in relation to the Syria response.¹⁹ Yet a consistent focus on all three, through the commitment of multiple partners, can facilitate support for this integrated programming approach.
61. Donors are an important audience for the NLG. Like in the Syria response, they are catalysts for how the needs of children, youth, and adolescents are met. The NLG can provide the messages, best/emerging practices, and innovative programming approaches that demonstrate how integrated programming around the three pillars enables immediate results, like enrolment, and more sustained results, like the child protection conditions that enable children to get the most out of educational opportunities and how a focus on youth and adolescents is integral to social cohesion. Donors can then, in turn, structure their priorities and funding to support such integrated approaches.
62. Other humanitarian actors, from local NGOs to the UN, will also benefit from the NLG’s focus on messages/advocacy, best/emerging practices, and innovative programming approaches. Yet, their role, with some variance, will be aligned with the “who” and “how” of the response. They will continue to focus on needs and vulnerability assessments (who) and then on *how* to address these through programming, partnership with government entities, strategic and project planning, etc.
63. **Recommendation:** Develop a model for the NLG that builds on its partnerships, highlights outcome level results, identifies best/emerging practices associated with integrated programming, uses succinct core messaging for advocacy, continues to advocate for human rights programming, and uses its existing competencies and competitive advantages as a regional forum to develop innovative solutions to cross-sector, cross-organisation operational problems related to integrated programming.
64. In brief, this may include:
 1. Build partnerships with a diverse range of actors who are committed to the key messages and integrated approach provided by the NLG. (This has already been accomplished by the NLG in the Syria response.)
 2. Draw on partners’ operational experience to promote best/emerging practices, always with a focus on the integration between education, child protection, and youth and adolescent programming.
 3. Compile and analyse existing data, highlighting gaps across the three pillars, as has been done to date. The NLG should take this a step further, going beyond output level data for each pillar and include analysis on outcome level results associated with integrated programming.²⁰
 4. As based upon outcome level results data, identify performance constraints or other issues that may be impeding results across multiple actors or approaches and then conduct “innovation workshops” that bring together diverse actors to develop specific and practical operational solutions designed to increase

¹⁹ This is unlikely to always be the initial focus. For instance, in countries without developed social services infrastructure, like Somalia, it may be child protection as a key component of immediate needs and potential resilience, thus increasing the propensity for investments in education. In places like Venezuela, it may be more on youth and adolescents.

²⁰ A similar recommendation, although more linked to output level data and links to the 3RP and SRP, was recommended in “No Lost Generation Initiative: A visioning document for 2015-2018.” Pages 23, 24.

results. These could be subsequently piloted/tested by different NLG partners at the country level and with a focus on efficacy and activities' capacities to be replicated and/or brought to scale.

5. While the value of the NLG will include advocacy, knowledge sharing, and a regional focus on integrated programming approaches, precise value, or return on investment, can also be measured by the solutions it develops, how these are then implemented by organisations at the country level, and how these contribute to better results. While the attribution for such results will need to be shared with implementing organisations—and calculations for how much can be attributed to the NLG and how much to such implementing organisations will undoubtedly be hard to calculate—a formula for the precise value of such solutions can be calculated and whatever may be attributed to the NLG is bound to be greater than the direct costs of the NLG. (See Section 3.3.2.)
65. This represents a specific model that may be taken forward in relation to the Syria crisis and other humanitarian responses. This model is expanded upon, with additional recommendations, throughout the rest of this evaluation.

3.2 Effectiveness

3.2.1 To what extent have the commitments, intended results, and/or articulated targets mentioned in the NLG vision and strategic documents been achieved? (EQ 2.1)

66. The targets included in the NLG vision, strategic, and annual reports tend to conflate what the NLG could do as a “strategy” with the escalating needs of children and young people cited by the 3RP, SHARP, and other regional and country level needs assessments and plans. (For a description of the broader Whole of Syria approach, see Section 3.4.2.) As commented upon by respondents to this evaluation, this caused some confusion as to what were NLG targets and what were targets for education, child protection, and youth and adolescent programming.
67. Nonetheless, it is worth comparing NLG activities against needs and funding levels across the period. This can be subsequently compared with results and any policy or legal framework changes that may have emerged due to the NLG's influence.

Increasing funding levels²¹

68. The financial analysis presented in this section is based on the most authoritative sources available for each subject. As indicated, this includes response plans, OCHA FTS, and NLG figures. This does make comparative analysis between these subjects difficult. It is thus recommended to consider each graph and associated analysis as distinct.
69. In the 2013 Syria Regional Response Plan, education was not highlighted as a strategic priority and yet distinct needs were emerging, especially in Lebanon and Jordan. Highlights from this first Regional Response Plan include:
 - Despite the enrolment campaign, 80 per cent of refugee children aged 6 to 17 were estimated to be out of school and in need of support. (Lebanon)²²
 - The plan in Jordan called for assistance to 33% of school age children: “During the process of RRP5 target-setting, the Education Working Group aims to reach 120,000 school aged children with formal education, which represents 33 per cent of the school aged population.” (Jordan)²³

²¹ This section also answers the Evaluation question 6.1: “Is there evidence that NLG initiative contributed to increased funding, accelerated programming and scaled-up programme interventions in the three programmatic areas, in response to the Syrian and Iraqi crises?”

²² “Syria Regional Response Plan 2013 – 2014.” United Nations/UNHCR. Page 110.

²³ IBID. Page 160.

- For Turkey, education is not cited as a priority area, given universal access provided by the GoT, with most attention focused on UNICEF support to child friendly spaces in camps and other temporary settlements. (Turkey)
- For Iraq, needs in 2013 focused on supporting refugees from Syria, including access to elementary, intermediate and secondary education for 87,500 children and access to technical and vocational education, literacy, life-skills and entrepreneurship training for 14,500 adolescents in camp and urban locations/host communities. (Iraq)²⁴
- In Egypt, the GoE allowed Syrian children access to public schools at the same rate as Egyptian children. There were issues associated with early education and enrolment procedures and so support included 23,000 refugee children in these areas. (Egypt)




Figure 7: Percentage funding to education, showing actual funding levels as percentage of all requirements & as a percentage of education requirements and actual funding levels. Source: Syria Regional Response Plans, 2014 – 2019.

70. In this context, the NLG emerged as a call to action, with an initial focus on education. The first major NLG presentation was in Washington D.C. in October 2013. This laid out the argument for education and cited the needs in Syria and the 5 host countries.²⁵ This was part of the first concerted efforts to press these needs in major donor capitals.
71. Within a year of this call to action, the situation had changed significantly, especially in host countries. By 2015 education was 93% funded in host countries. Funding in Lebanon (appeal: \$226 million; \$241 actual) and Turkey (appeal: \$59 million; \$67 actual) exceeded stated requirements while Egypt (37% of requirements actually funded), Iraq (59%), and Jordan (75%) did not.
72. In Lebanon, 2015 funding coincided with the Ministry of Education and Higher Education’s (MEHE) roll-out of the Reaching All Children with Education (RACE) strategy.
73. In Turkey, children had already been accepted into Turkish schools and, in 2015, Turkey developed 19 Provincial Action Plans (PAPs) to respond to the needs of children from Syria.
74. By the time of the first London Conference in February 2016, donors—the six largest were the European Union, the United States, Germany, United Kingdom, Norway, and Japan—committed to provide \$1.4 billion in funding for education inside Syria and in neighbouring countries. They also agreed with refugee-hosting countries to enrol all Syrian refugee children, as well as vulnerable children in host communities, in “quality education” by the end of 2016-2017. While aligned with NLG priorities, these events also coincided with donor priorities and specific pledge amounts for education.
75. These, and other actions, all contributed to the push for education and while the direct relationship to the NLG is difficult to assess, it certainly played an important role. The trends in Figure 7 are illustrative of the fact that while education needs were funded at a higher level as a ratio of requirements to actual funding, especially in comparison with other sectors, the actual requirements for education, as a percentage of total requirements, changed little over the period, between 14% and 18% of total needs.

²⁴ IBID. Page 269.

²⁵ “A Lost generation?” No Lost Generation. Washington D.C.; October 2013.

76. In relation to funding inside Syria, the trend was largely unmoved over the same period. In analysing the percentage of funding to education and protection services from 2014 – 2018,²⁶ actual funding for education never exceeded 4% of total actual funding, and protection services overall never exceeded 5% (both in 2017). (Figure 8)²⁷




Figure 8: Trends in education and protection funding; Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan (SHARP) 2014 – 2018. Source: OCHA Financial Tracking Service (FTS) * By 2017, 'protection and community services' had been consolidated under the heading 'protection'.

77. While there was an increasing focus on education in the host countries, as a priority, education and protection remained a small proportion of overall needs inside Syria. Food, NFIs and shelter, health, and WASH constituted most of the requirements.

78. This did change in Syria, although more slowly and to less effect than in host countries. As a percentage of funding to total requirements, there was an increase in funding for education and protection from 2016 inside




Figure 9: Percentage of Funding to education & protection as a percentage of total requirements. Source: Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan, 2014 - 2018

Syria. (Figure 9) However, these funding levels never achieved those seen in 3RP countries which went from 93% funded in 2015 to 55% funded in 2018. (Figure 7)

79. The capacity to work with a single government entity inside Syria changed over the course of the crisis, with infrastructure and other capabilities increasingly destroyed. This was not the case in 3RP countries, comparatively, and so there was greater consistency in how the international community could work with governments there. However, much of this is based on conjecture—the evaluation was not able to pinpoint definitive evidence for these trends. Thus, the evidence is presented *prima facie*, important to trends overall but impossible to attribute to the NLG or other factors in isolation.

²⁶ Figures that differentiated between “protection” and “child protection” were not available.

²⁷ These figures are based on FTS figures as the authoritative source on actual funding total received. There are differences in these and other sources that may indicate a change in 1 – 2 percentage points; not enough to distract from the primary point.

80. The figures above are based on education as the 3RP, SHARP, and similar documents do not disaggregate protection to include child protection or youth and adolescent programming. NLG documentation does provide this information.

81. Figure 10 shows funding as a percentage of total requirements for education and child protection combined from the SHARP and 3RP. This illustrates a spike in funding for




Figure 10: Actual funding as a percentage of stated requirements for education & child protection. Source: NLG Annual Reports.

both education and child protection in 2016, with a decline in 2017. Child protection remained above 2014 – 2015 levels although education fell to just above 2014 levels. The NLG also reports on funding for youth and adolescent programming for 2017. This shows that it was funded to approximately 37% of requirements.²⁸



82. **Conclusion:** The NLG influenced funding levels, especially earlier in the response and in relation to youth and adolescent programming later. This was the case in host countries where funding levels in education, particularly, grew to unprecedented levels, but less so in Syria over the duration of the response where education was less prioritised and where funding for total requirements remained low in comparison to 3RP countries.

83. These trends show that education, particularly, but also protection and child protection, experienced a mixed level of funding from 2014 – 2018.
84. For 3RP countries, education was 93% funded in 2015, possibly reflecting a mix of influence by the NLG and the high funding levels in Lebanon and Turkey where there were government plans for education to which donors and the international community could align. However, needs continued to increase so that while funding levels remained high, they dropped to 76% of requirements by 2016, falling again to 54% in 2017, and 55% in 2018. (Figure 7)
85. For Syria, there has been an increase in funding as compared with needs although these never breached more than 36% of needs for education (2017) and 33% of needs for protection (2018).
86. These trends reflect a myriad of intervening variables, from increasing needs and international focus, like the London and Brussels events, alongside the efforts of the NLG. (See Section 3.2.4 for more on the factors that impeded or supported the NLG.) It is impossible to separate out the NLG from these other variables and to thus determine the precise attribution it may have had on these funding levels. It is clear that the NLG, priorities from the international community, and country-level plans, did coalesce so that there was a significant level of funding for education by 2016. Yet, these trends indicate that this dissipated thereafter with, again, a range of factors that influenced funding levels for education and child protection. Without the ability to control for a number of confounding variables, it is impossible to quantitatively determine what effect – if any – the NLG had on funding levels for the response plans covering the Syria and Iraq crises. However, coverage for the education sector in other responses, e.g. Yemen, South Sudan, has tended to be lower.
87. This is not meant to diminish the contributions of the NLG. Respondents to this evaluation are positive about the NLG’s influence on funding levels. This is demonstrated in the evaluation’s survey question on this issue (Figure 11) which had a 2.99 rating out of 4.00. (The average rating across the 12 survey questions was 2.67;

²⁸ NLG Annual Reports.

the highest was 3.33 for was for the alignment of the NLG with the human rights of the child; the lowest was 2.08 for the NLG’s influence on policies and legal frameworks.)

88. Qualitative evidence from semi-structured interviews supports this further, with many respondents stating that the NLG had influenced funding levels earlier in the response. Donors were the least optimistic, citing the rationale that appeals (3RP; SHARP) and donor priorities became more influential as the crisis continued.

89. The response was, of course, driven by these formal coordination and appeal mechanisms. Yet, the NLG remained an element in these, with specific “No Lost Generation” sections in plans and progress reports. NLG remained part of overall campaigns through events and activities




Figure 11: Evaluation survey question: “Has the NLG influenced Increasing funding levels for education, child protection, and youth/adolescent programming?” (EQ 2.1)

that put a spotlight on the needs of children, be they in regional forms, as a “shorthand” for country level conversations with governments, or at major international donor conferences and events, like the London and Brussels events and the World Humanitarian Summit.

90. These and other aspects of this evaluation demonstrate that, as a “message” and “strategy” that enabled humanitarian actors across the Syrian response to focus on integrated approaches to education and child protection, the NLG had significant impact. As the Syrian response continued, it became more complicated, with more and more actors, harder political realities, and a continuing escalation in the needs of children, youth, and adolescents.

Scope and quality of the humanitarian response

91. From 2013 – 2015, the NLG’s focus was primarily on education, although the original intent was always as an integrated approach to education and child protection. (See Section 3.1.1.)

92. From 2016, the NLG clarified its focus on education, child protection, and youth and adolescent programming (the “three pillars”) and it continued to cite results in annual reports, presentations to different donors and donor events, and to humanitarian actors across the Syria response. In 2016, there was also an expansion of partners (See Section 3.2.2) and a wider breadth of activities and events associated with the three pillars. As cited in the 2016 Update, the NLG conducted:

- A side event at the World Humanitarian Summit that included 5 young people affected by the Syria crisis;
- A donor briefing in Amman;
- A presentation and briefing at the UN General Assembly;
- Sponsorship of a youth delegation to UNHCR’s High Commissioner’s Dialogue;
- The support of student groups from 51 universities (49 in the United States) “seeking to take action to promote education for refugees”;
- Webinars on subjects of particular concern, such as child labour;
- The launch of the NLG website;
- The creation of an NLG directory of sources and resource repository; and
- The launch of an NLG newsletter.

93. These types of activities accelerated in 2017, with additional activities organised according to advocacy, knowledge management, and working in partnership.²⁹
94. While NLG partners and others appreciated these activities (Sections 0 and 3.3.1), they have not been enough to ensure enrolment of all children affected by the crisis, as committed to by donors and host countries in the London Conference in February 2016 and in subsequent events thereafter, such as Brussels I, II, and III. As Figure 12 illustrates, in 2018 around 2.8 million school-age Syrian children (36%) remained out of school in Syria and the five host countries. While the majority of out-of-school children were in Syria, 9% in host countries (approximately 252,000; with some recent estimates putting this upwards of 700,000) is still considerably high and falls below the commitments of the international community.




Figure 12: Number of school-age Syrian children and in and out of school in Syria and host countries.³⁰

95. The NLG has consistently highlighted these needs, in every update and various other materials. Many respondents to this evaluation state that NLG materials were useful, mainly in being able to encapsulate the needs and issues in concise documents. Nonetheless, the needs of children exceeded these best efforts and the broader commitments of the international community.



96. **Conclusion:** The NLG never had the mechanisms to directly influence the scope or quality of programming and so its influence here was minimal. While efforts after 2016 to have events and materials on various relevant issues were received well, there was no real way to link these with actual operational strategies and plans at the country level.

97. The NLG never had the mechanisms to directly influence the scope of programming. Without practical ways to hold different actors accountable to stated results, and to push them towards quality services, it is hard to fathom how it would have. This accountability should lie with affected populations, civil society, government actors, and donors. The NLG is not any of these. Instead, it highlighted best or emerging practices that could be taken up by respective actors and, as stated by respondents, it did this well. Yet, even in doing so, NLG activities, like those cited from 2017 above, were a mix of advocacy and knowledge management. They didn't have any real link to the quality of programming. As respondents commented in this evaluation, any such links were tenuous at best. (See Section 3.3.5.)

²⁹ "No Lost Generation Update: January – December 2017." NLG. Pages 16 - 18.

³⁰ "We Made A Promise: Ensuring Learning Pathways and Protection for Syrian Children and Youth." Brussels Conference; April 2018. Page 2.

Policy/legal framework changes

98. The NLG began to cite policy issues as early as 2014 when, in the NLG Annual Report, the need for certification of completion for refugee children and the Syria Curriculum and Certification Initiative was cited.³¹ This was in relation to a UNICEF report on the subject from March 2015.³² Civil documentation was cited more broadly in the NLG 2016 Annual Report.




Figure 13: Evaluation survey question: “Has the NLG influenced policy/legal framework changes in the affected countries to develop a protective and more enabling environment for children and youth?” (Geographic cohorts; EQ 2.1)

99. There are few other direct mentions of policy and legal frameworks in NLG annual reports.

100. This is confirmed through responses from the evaluation’s survey. Cohorts rated the question concerning the NLG’s influence on policy and legal frameworks the lowest amongst all 12 questions. Donors and respondents in Turkey were the most positive, although there are no clear rationales for these slightly higher ratings. Cohorts at the regional level rated this lowest, given their limited insight into country-level policies and legal frameworks.




Figure 14: Evaluation survey question: “Has the NLG influenced policy/legal framework changes in the affected countries to develop a protective and more enabling environment for children and youth?” (Organisational cohorts; EQ 2.1)



101. **Conclusion:** The NLG’s influence on policy and legal frameworks has been understandably minimal.

102. From 2016, as the NLG broadened its partnerships and activities, opportunities emerged to influence policies and legal frameworks. This influence was achieved by integrated approaches to education and protection for all children, including adolescents and youth. This is aligned with the CRC. As this section and other parts of this evaluation illustrate, humanitarian action often devolves toward discrete outputs—the number of people served by various activities. The promise of an integrated approach focuses on outcomes, the capacity and opportunity for children to reach their full potential, and impact, the capacity and opportunity for children to develop into productive adults for their families, communities, and societies. This inevitably involves policies and legal frameworks. Nonetheless, this is not the purview of the NLG. The NLG could cite best and emerging practices as well as gaps and issues that may be overlooked, especially as humanitarian responses follow the trajectory from emergency response to sustainable development. These

³¹ “No Lost Generation Initiative: One Year Report.” NLG; September 2014. Page 10.

³² “Curriculum, Accreditation and Certification for Syrian Children in Syria, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt.” UNICEF Regional Study; March 2015.

will have policy implications and may help international actors as they work with governments and others to develop policies that will guide these sustained actions.

3.2.2 To what extent did the NLG expand the number and type of actors it was influencing/changing? (EQ 2.2)

103. In the first phase of the NLG (2013 – 2015), the focus was, most argue, on donors. The NLG was conceived as a “strategy” and served to highlight both the needs of children affected by the Syria crisis and the importance of an integrated approach to education and child protection. The notion of a “lost generation” resonated with donors and others. As noted in Section 3.2.1, this coincided with various activities that all had an influence on increased funding for education, particularly, and mainly, in host countries compared to inside Syria.

104. By the time of the Concept Note of October 2015, the NLG broadened its scope to be a forum for partners, calling for “A technical group comprising key UN, NGO and donor partners [to] meet on a regular basis.”³³ This was based on a survey at the end of 2015 that pointed to the value of the NLG as a way to “unite a wide range of stakeholders to collaborate on issues affecting children and young people.”³⁴




Figure 15: Number and type of NLG partners, 2016 - 2018

105. The number of NLG partners grew steadily after 2016. By the end of 2016, the NLG included 8 INGOs and 9 UN organisations. By the end of 2017, it included 18 INGOs and 11 UN organisations. By the end of 2018, it included 27 INGOs and 11 UN organisations. Some UN organisations left the NLG, like FAO and OHCHR, and were replaced with other UN organisations, like IOM, UNESCO, UNFPA, UN Women, and the WHO. Amongst INGOs, the Malala Fund switched from being an organisation involved in the secretariat to be a donor to the NLG.

106. The NLG also made concerted efforts after 2015 to include youth and adolescents in NLG activities, including delegations to the UN General Assembly, the World Humanitarian Summit, and the Brussels conference, amongst others.

107. The NLG has not included government actors consistently. As respondents in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, indicate, the language and priorities of the NLG became integral to how they positioned issues with government actors and yet there was considerable difference between these and the other countries covered by the NLG.

³³ “The No Lost Generation Initiative: Next Phase.” NLG; October 2015. Page 8.

³⁴ IBID.

108. In considering how working in partnership contributed to better results, respondents were mostly positive. (Figure 16) Most viewed the NLG as a useful framework and a “shorthand” for discussing the importance of education and child protection. Many




Figure 16: Did the expansion of NLG partners and working in partnership contribute to better results and/or constrain/complicate NLG activities and approaches? (2.2) (Qualitative evidence; organisational cohorts)

respondents state, especially those from NGOs, that being a partner in the NLG is seen as a “stamp of approval” that can be used for resource mobilisation strategies.



109. Conclusion: The NLG should continue to foster partnerships across a broad array of actors while clarifying its role as an advocacy platform for resource mobilisation (primarily), focusing on outcome level results, and conducting “innovation workshops” on performance issues that impede integrated approaches to the “whole child.” (See Section 3.1.4.)

110. By the end of 2015, the NLG was recognised regionally and internationally as a “clarion call” for children—a powerful message that called people to action to avoid a “lost generation.” This coincided with increased funding for education and child protection (Section 3.2.1) and an alignment with government plans, especially in Lebanon and Turkey that hosted the most refugees. In some regards, the key promises of the NLG were accepted as integral to the response by the end of 2015. While serious gaps remained in both access and quality of services, no reasonable actor was denying the need for a focus on education, child protection and, increasingly, youth and adolescent programming.
111. This success raised the question of what role the NLG could play in its “second phase.” As based on the October 2018 Concept Note, the decision was made by existing NLG partners to expand the number of partners and to broaden its focus on the issues associated with education, child protection, and youth and adolescent programming. Many organisations joined the NLG partnership, increasing from 17 in 2016 to 38 by 2018. As described in Section 3.3.1, the NLG’s operational model expanded to include a secretariat, co-chaired by UNICEF, Mercy Corps, and World Vision, additional UN and INGO partners, and affiliations with local organisations, donors, specific “champions” that included senior UN and INGO officials, UNICEF Goodwill Ambassadors, collaborations around technology and other innovative solutions, and children and young people. This growing number of partners and supporters is an example of the commitment to the NLG and the value it provides different partners.
112. This often led to compelling results. The increased focus on youth and adolescent programming came from the partnership, as did events on Gender-based Violence GBV, and the partnership with NetHope that brought together leading technology companies to explore innovative solutions to programming issues. Respondents consistently state that NLG activities and materials were highly professional and generally effective. (Section 0.)
113. At the same time, once the essential message of the NLG had been subsumed by the mechanisms of the response (See Section 3.2.1), the overall purpose of the NLG became less clear to many. It was positioned as an “advocacy and knowledge sharing platform” and yet, without a coherent overarching purpose, partners, committed as they were, were left to jockey for different activities and areas of focus. This led NLG partners to state that it often seemed like decisions were made based on either the partners with the “most resources” or those with the “loudest voice” in NLG meetings.

114. The greatest complication to emerge from this were differing views as to the NLG’s purpose. Some NLG partners argued that there needed to be a focus on the scope and quality of programming given that so many needs remained. Some, perhaps less explicitly, argued that the NLG should be used as a catalyst, or a “stamp of approval,” for resource mobilisation. Some appreciated the regional meetings and events and were happy enough to limit their contribution to participating in these. Universally, they all agreed that the NLG was a worthy endeavour, but this lack of focus allowed multiple interests to be pursued, leading to some frustration overall.
115. Yet the commitment of so many partners, associates, and champions, despite the lack of clear operational focus, is testament to the NLG’s capacity to do more. Needs persist and the NLG has yet to achieve the same groundswell of support for a fully integrated approach to the “whole child,” encompassing education and child protection for all children, youth, and adolescents, as well as continuing to be an advocacy platform for resource mobilisation internationally.
116. As noted in Section 3.1.4, the NLG is not only relevant to the Syria and Iraq crises but can be a model for other humanitarian responses. As recommended in that section, this may be achieved by focusing on partnership, identification of best/emerging practices in relation to approaches that focus on the “whole child,” outcome level results data (as compared to output level results and gaps as done currently), and “innovation workshops” to focus on performance constraints associated with integrated programming (compared to distinct issues in education, child protection, or youth and adolescent programming) that impede results across multiple actors or approaches. Part of this will depend on a somewhat different approach to NLG partnership.
117. **Recommendation:** Create partnership tiers with an expanded secretariat/working group, semi-annual partnership meetings, and an annual event to “showcase” NLG results and to give a platform for youths and adolescents.
118. The NLG may consider a tiered approach to partnership. The **first tier** may include those that co-chair the NLG. (See Section 3.3.2.)
119. The **second tier** should include partners that actively provide integrated programming solutions across the pillars and who are committed to the NLG as a platform for identifying best/emerging practices and to compiling and publicising outcome level results data. This tier of partnership should include the largest actors in regard to integrated programming, thus providing the best foundation for identifying best/emerging practices. This tier would also commit resources, human and/or financial (ideally both), as a way to bolster their regular engagement in the NLG activities, including regular meetings, events, dissemination of outcome level results data, “innovation workshops” to identify operational solutions, and in the piloting/testing of such operational solutions. (See Section 3.3.1 for more on the proposed funding model.)
120. The **third tier** should include partners that commit to the NLG messages and approach and that can provide different levels of support given their interest, priorities, and available resources.
121. As done currently, the NLG should also continue to focus on a mix of UN organisations and INGOs, including opening the forum to national NGOs or other local actors. The inclusion of civil society or government actors could be considered although, as direct recipients of aid, their priorities and needs may go beyond what the NLG could support.

Potential Annual Cycle of Meetings for Different Partnership Tiers

Monthly Secretariat Meetings (1st tier)

- Overall management and planning
- Administrative and finance
- Outcome level results data tracking

Semi-Annual Partnership Meetings (1st & 2nd tiers)

- Outcome levels results review
- Identification of best/emerging practices
- Discussion/agreement on “innovation workshop” topics

Annual Event (All+ Donors)

- Reporting on “innovation workshops”
- Children, Youth and Adolescents Voices
- Showcase of NLG results/Annual Report

3.2.3 How did the NLG provide insight to, and otherwise support, how actors respect the rights of the child, gender equality, and human rights-based approaches? (EQ 2.3)

122. By its focus on an integrated approach to education and child protection, the NLG is aligned with the rights of the child. (See Section 3.1.1.) This was recognised by most respondents. (Figure 17)




Figure 17: How did the NLG provide insight to and otherwise support how actors respected the rights of the child, gender equality, and human rights-based approaches? (2.3) (Qualitative evidence; geographical cohorts)

123. Respondents from UN organisations were the most positive, with respondents citing how the NLG is aligned with its programming and how, with a focus on the rights of the child, the NLG provided a framework/messaging for these rights-based issues. Respondents from NGOs and donors were less positive, citing that issues of gender were particularly difficult in the region and that the NLG had not done enough to address issues specific to girls and boys. Respondents from Turkey were also critical of the NLG in this regard.
124. In the review of NLG reports and related documentation, however, there is seldom mention of issues related to gender equality or best or emerging practices in relation to human rights-based approaches.



125. Conclusion: While the NLG is aligned with the rights of the child (CRC), it could do more to incorporate gender equality and women’s empowerment as integral to effective child protection and education approaches. (See Section 3.5.1.)

126. An integrated approach to education and child protection is completely aligned with the rights of the child. The NLG, by focusing on these and youth and adolescent programming, reflects the CRC and the fact that children’s most basic rights cannot be delineated to one sector or another. The whole child must be considered if these rights are to be realised.
127. This fundamental link to the CRC was not emphasized in NLG materials and activities. As is often the case amongst humanitarian actors, the focus shifted to the pragmatic: the discrete needs of children, youth, and adolescents and whether these were being met. While this provides a practical focus, especially for funding, it ignores the most basic tenet of the NLG: that the international community cannot sit idly by while an entire generation of children is “lost.” What were they losing? They were “losing” their fundamental rights; not simply access to education.
128. The NLG is a rights-based approach and it had the most clear and demonstrable effect early in the response when the notion of a “lost generation” caught the attention of actors across the Syria response. As the pace, scale, and complexity of the response grew, the NLG tended to reflect this “machinery,” emphasising needs over fundamental human rights.
129. The NLG also missed the importance of gender equality and women’s empowerment. The 2018 NLG Workplan does cite the need “to increase awareness on issues facing adolescent girls and women; strengthen capacity of stakeholders and practitioners on gender equality programming; and promote both

a gender and disability lens in No Lost Generation initiative programming and advocacy objectives; and enhance reporting and evidence through sex disaggregated data.”³⁵ Yet, there is little evidence that this has occurred.

130. Gender equality is important, not only in relation to girls and boys, but also in relation to women’s empowerment. Mothers are most often the primary family member responsible for their children’s protection and education. How they fulfil this role not only concerns their children but also the possibilities for their own empowerment. These and other issues are described in the UNICEF “Gender Action Plan 2018 - 2021” that calls for “advancing gender equality and the rights of women and girls [as] essential to realizing the rights of all children.”³⁶ (See more on the links between the NLG and UNICEF’s Gender Action Plan in Section 3.5.1.)

3.2.4 What were the major factors in each phase and at each level, that contributed to the achievements of the initiative’s intents or hampered achieving of those intents? (EQ 2.4)

131. The NLG provided a clarion call at a time when the international community was beginning to recognise the fact that the Syria crisis would be protracted and when the scale of needs was reaching unprecedented levels. From 2016, it clarified its approach to education, child protection, and youth and adolescent programming, and expanded its partners, associates, and champions.
132. The NLG achieved this in an historically unprecedented humanitarian response. There have been so many intervening variables, from geopolitical considerations to the myriad of operational constraints that have impacted education, child protection, and youth and adolescent programming, in all of the concerned countries, that it is remarkable that the NLG continues to be relevant and effective in the ways described in this evaluation.
133. Trying to catalogue all of these factors would go beyond the remit of this Evaluation. It is worth considering the issues that were most often raised by respondents and that had the most impact on the NLG. This list is not meant to be exhaustive but to, instead, include factors not addressed elsewhere.

Phase One: The Clarion Call (2013 – 2015)

134. *The slow realisation that this would be a long and largely unprecedented humanitarian response.* The war in Syria occurred after the 2011 “Arab Spring” protests and there was still hope that it might be resolved quickly. Former Secretary General Kofi Anan brokered a peace plan with the Arab League and the United Nations in March of 2012. When this failed, there was still hope that the war could be ended but, instead, it escalated in 2013. By early 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) expanded across Iraq. By the end of 2014, the US and Russia had increased their interventions. It was around this time that most recognised that this would be a long and devastating war, with more than 3 million Syrian refugees dispersed across Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Turkey and Egypt, and another 6.5 million people displaced within Syria.
135. *The NLG had support from the highest levels of the UN and governments.* By the time of the “One Year On” meeting at UNICEF in New York on 24 September 2014, the international community had been mobilised around the No Lost Generation initiative. The meeting included heads of state, ministers, and UN officials. Minister of Education for Lebanon Elias Bou Saab and former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Gordon Brown spoke, and UNICEF’s Executive Director, who was involved in the inception of the NLG, stated: “Helping the children of Syria is investing in the future of Syria, as today’s children are tomorrow’s doctors, teachers, lawyers and leaders. Investing in this generation is helping them acquire the skills and knowledge they will need to rebuild their communities when peace returns. We need to heal their hearts and minds. And there is so much more to be done.”³⁷
136. *Literate population with near universal access to primary education before the Syria crisis.* The Middle East has generally high literacy rates, with 78% literacy in 2010, and the net enrolment in primary education for

³⁵ “NLG 2018 Workplan.” NLG; 21 May 2018. Page 5.

³⁶ “Gender Action Plan 2018 – 2021.” UNICEF. (<https://www.unicef.org/gender-equality/gender-action-plan-2018-2021>.)

³⁷ Alexandra Brunals; “Sustaining the commitment to preventing a lost generation of Syrian children.” UNICEF Press Release; 24 September 2014.

- both boys and girls was at 94% before the Syria crisis.³⁸ This made the “loss” certainly more palpable to families in Syria and for refugees elsewhere.
137. *Host government’s existing services, infrastructure, and economic standing.* While host governments’ services have been severely strained, they are middle-income countries with established ministries and educational infrastructure, as attested by the near universal access to primary education cited immediately above. This facilitated education programming as there were schools, teachers, established curricula, national standards, etc. that could be deployed, with variance across the 3RP countries, towards the needs of refugee children. It is much more difficult to imagine how the needs of so many children would be met in countries where such infrastructure does not exist.
 138. *Donors’ support of education, particularly the EU.* Respondents state that there was already a recognition of the need to focus on education in humanitarian responses prior to the NLG. This led to the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis in 2014 that mobilised €1.6 billion by 2018, with a priority on basic education and child protection. The EU and member states mobilised over €17 billion in humanitarian aid and stabilisation assistance for the Syria crisis since 2011.
 139. *Inordinate focus on the “right” coordination structures, especially given issues between UNHCR and OCHA, complicated the response.* In 2013 and 2014, there was some confusion as to who should lead the response, with UNHCR and OCHA jockeying for the position. This led to some confusion and frustration as UNHCR took the lead in host countries and OCHA inside Syria. While difficult to validate, this contributed to the focus on protection in the 3RP countries and more traditional emergency response clusters inside Syria, as described in Section 3.2.1.
 140. *As the response became more aligned with government plans and strategies, UNICEF emerged as a primary partner.* This was especially the case in Lebanon with the RACE strategy although UNICEF also played a key role in moving from emergency response to more sustained, development responses, in all 3RP countries. This also enabled a more concerted effort at integrated education and child protection approaches.
 141. *Attraction of educational enrolment to donors—anything that could show some positive results.* While somewhat cynical, many respondents note that education was appealing to donors because of the simple fact that enrolment is easy to count. The international community could count the number of enrolled children as a demonstrable success.
 142. *The devastating level of conflict within Syria, leaving most of the response focused on host countries.* By the end of 2015, there were an estimated 13.5 million people in need of humanitarian assistance with 8.7 million in need of multi-sectoral assistance. As the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) for 2015 states: “Human rights violations and abuse occur in the context of widespread insecurity and disregard for the standards of international law and international humanitarian law (IHL). The crisis is characterized by the current absence of effective protection for a significant number of civilians. In addition, attacks against schools, hospitals, water networks, electricity plants, places of worship, economic assets and other civilian infrastructure continue unabated.”³⁹

Phase Two: Intelligence & Partnership (2016 – 2018)

143. *The Brussels Conferences.* The first “Brussels Conference on Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region” was held in April 2017, one year after the London Conference. The Brussels Conference included representatives of over 70 countries and included multi-year pledges of US\$10 billion in grants and US\$30 billion in loans from International Financial institutions (IFIs). This was followed by subsequent Brussels Conferences in April 2018 and March 2019. These conferences included high level panels drawn from the highest levels of government, the UN, NGOs, and civil society. The No Lost Generation initiative contributed to these conferences, including two reports (“We Made a Promise: Ensuring Learning Pathways and Protection for Syrian Children and Youth” and “No Lost Generation Evidence Brief: Hear the Voices of Syria’s Adolescents and Youth.”) and side events with ECHO. The NLG also made similar contributions to the 2016 London Conference, along with the Whole of Syria education sector.

³⁸ “Education in the Middle East and North Africa.” World Bank Brief; 27 January 2014.

³⁹ “Humanitarian Response Plan for the Syrian Arab Republic; January – December 2016.” OCHA. Page 7.

144. *The fear of a refugee exodus to Europe.* On 2 September 2015, the horrifying images of three-year-old Aylan Kurdi, from Syria, drowned on the beaches of Bordum, Turkey, gained international attention. While this raised attention to the horrors of the Syria crisis it also raised fears of the increasing flow of refugees to Europe. While impossible to track attribution from this single event and the response of European and other actors, it was certainly a factor in how the response to the Syria crisis was seen.
145. *Shift to sustainable development approaches.* While the conflict continued to be devastating inside Syria and Iraq, the 3RP countries had largely shifted to government led strategies and plans. RACE II was launched in Lebanon. The Jordan Response Plan 2018 – 2020 was launched in late 2017 and became the strategy for humanitarian and development efforts there. Efforts in Turkey continued to be coordinated with the government. At some level, this alignment with country level plans and strategies reduced the need for a clarion call for a lost generation. While needs persisted, international actors could see the transition to government and the focus thus shifted to longer-term, seemingly “non-emergency,” needs.
146. *Continued attraction of donors to education, with more efforts on the quality of education.* By 2016, it was clear that enrolment was not enough. More and more attention was given to the quality of education, including increased accelerated learning programmes across the 3RP countries; teacher training, including in psycho-social support; continued focus on school infrastructure and transportation, etc. These issues are inherently more complicated than enrolment alone. These issues were raised by NLG partners and became, increasingly, part of the NLG’s focus. It began to address them in annual reports and held events on cross-sector issues, like child labour and child marriage.
147. *NLG website, knowledge portal, and resource depository.* While addressed elsewhere, from 2016 the NLG developed on-line resources that respondents cite as useful. This coincided with the increasing number of NLG partners and with a broadening of its scope beyond a clarion call focused on advocacy and resource mobilisation.
148. *The NLG Tech Summit.* Following on from the 2017 EdTech summit, the NLG sponsored a two-day event to “bring together youth, private sector companies, development and humanitarian experts, academic institutions and donors to leverage technology and cross-sector collaboration to connect learning to earning for young people in the region, particularly those affected by the crises in Syria and Iraq.” in February 2018.⁴⁰ Respondents to this Evaluation universally heralded this as an exceptional event. It also signalled the NLG’s capacity to draw together diverse actors toward innovative solutions, something that this evaluation recommends as a model going forward. This led to the establishment of the “NLG Tech Task Force” that includes youth, private sector actors, and traditional parties to investigate how technology can be used to address operational issues across the NLG pillars.

Phase Three: Integrated solutions for the whole child and how to meet needs inside Syria

149. While somewhat premature, there are a few factors to consider going forward that were raised by respondents. The first is related to a focus on integrated solutions, as described in various parts of this report.
150. *Syria needs a bold clarion call now.* The second factor raised by respondents concerns questions around the needs of children inside Syria. Respondents describe the potential dilemma associated with supporting a regime accused of war crimes in recovery and reconstruction efforts.⁴¹ This may signal the need for the NLG to resound a “clarion call,” cutting through various consternations and complications to facilitate a focus on the needs of children.

⁴⁰ NLG website.

⁴¹ The Brussels III Conference on “Supporting the future of Syria and the region” included a “co-chairs declaration” that states: “Participants renewed their full commitment to continue promoting accountability and justice as an inherent part of any meaningful process of genuine and sustainable reconciliation in Syria. All those responsible for breaches of international law, including the use of chemical weapons and the blatant violations of international humanitarian and human rights law of which some may constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity, must be held accountable.”

3.3 Efficiency⁴²

3.3.1 **Considering the scope, objectives and composition of the NLG, was the chosen operational model the best fit to achieve influence and change? (EQ 3.1)**

151. The NLG operating model was first detailed in a “Decision Memo” from the office of the Executive Director for UNICEF in February 2014.⁴³ This includes details for planning, coordination and oversight, and monitoring and reporting. It called for the NLG to be integral to existing coordination mechanisms, with the education sector groups and child protection working groups charged with overseeing the coordination of the NLG. These, in turn, would be overseen by the Humanitarian Country Team/UN Country Team (HCT/UNCT) as part of the SHARP and RRP. This “Decision Memo” also called for a regional NLG coordinator to work with the HCT/UNCT in the Strategic Steering Committee and relevant Technical Working Groups. Planning, monitoring, and reporting were the responsibility of sector coordination groups with monitoring conducted by OCHA and UNHCR, amongst others. This operating model thus delineated NLG activities to relevant clusters/sectors, particularly the education sector and the child protection sub-working groups.
152. In 2016, UNICEF extended an invitation to NGOs to become part of a joint-secretariat. This was part of the move to use the NLG as a platform for collaboration. (See Section 3.2.2.) The co-lead requirements included:⁴⁴

Co-lead Function

- Secretariat functions required for the convening of the NLG Working Group.
- Advocacy Task Force (ATF) and other related regional NLG meetings.
- Leadership in the sector, across the region and more widely in championing the aims and objectives of the NLG initiative.

Co-lead Requirements

- Must commit to support the secretariat functions required for the convening of the NLG Working Group (WG), Advocacy Task Force (ATF) and other related regional NLG meetings.
 - Must commit to showing leadership in the sector, across the region and more widely in championing the aims and objectives of the NLG initiative.
 - Must commit to undertaking tasks as determined by the NLG WG and ATF that respond to key priorities and enable the groups to meaningfully function.
 - Must commit significant resourcing to the regional NLG functions, with at least 25% of one staff position (can be split across different staff within a single NGO provided it does not affect the delivery of required tasks).
 - Must demonstrate long term engagement in NLG Working Group.
 - Must have senior management support for co-leadership and agreement by them that they will champion NLG messages in a non-partisan manner, both in the region, in Headquarters and in other global capitals.
 - Must demonstrate technical expertise in at least one NLG pillar (education, child protection or youth engagement).
 - Must be delivering NLG programming in at least 4 of the specified countries (Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Turkey, Egypt).
153. Respondents to this Evaluation have middling impressions of this second phase operating model. Overall, respondents to the survey rated this at 2.55 out of 4.00. (Figure 18). (The average rating across the 12 survey questions was 2.67; the highest was 3.33 for was for the alignment of the NLG with the human rights of the child; the lowest was 2.08 for the NLG’s influence on policies and legal frameworks.) There was no deviation (σ^2 0.85) from this overall rating amongst all cohorts, geographic or organisational.

⁴² There was not sufficient evidence to answer the following questions under efficiency: “Were efficiencies of scale reached by having a common framework?” (EQ 3.3). However, the issues associated with these questions are addressed throughout this section.

⁴³ “Update and Next Steps for the Implementation of the No Lost Generation Strategy.” Decision Memo from the office of the Executive Director, UNICEF; 2 February 2014.

⁴⁴ “No Lost Generation: NGO Co-Lead proposal.” UNICEF; 16 June 2016.

154. In interviews, respondents did not cite examples of problems with the operational model. Instead, they tended to describe the lack of focus for the NLG, the dominance of larger organisations, and that NLG decisions seemed either *ad hoc* or based on the priorities of organisations with resources to pursue different activities.




Figure 18: Survey question: “Considering the scope, objectives and composition of the NLG, was the chosen operational model the best fit to achieve influence and change? (3.1)”



155. **Conclusion:** The NLG operating model was first meant to be integrated into existing coordination structures and then, in phase two, it developed as a partnership and knowledge sharing platform. These made sense at the time, but the second operating model could be strengthened going forward.

“Not sure about efficiency but the co-chair approach to the NLG was very good—it really ensured that different organisations could participate even if some were not able to participate as much as they might have liked.”

Representative quote from respondent.

156. The operating model can be considered along the lines of the adage that “form follows function.” Initially, the NLG was designed to:

- “Be collaborative, by encompassing many different partners and stakeholders. (partnership)
- Act as a platform to gather momentum behind existing initiatives and response efforts. (advocacy)
- Bring attention to a long undervalued and yet strategic aspects of the crisis. (advocacy)
- Illustrate a powerful and practical way to bridge humanitarian and development responses. (advocacy)
- Raise more resources for all partners involved to fully invest in children’s futures.”⁴⁵ (resource mobilisation)

157. Given this, the “operating model” was designed to generate communication messages and information from multiple actors to inform the SHARP/RRP processes.

158. This changed in 2016 with the inclusion of NGO co-leads and there was a clarification of what “counted” as NLG programming:

- Contribution to at least one of the three pillars of NLG;
- Intention to contribute to one or more of the outcomes under each relevant pillar;
- Delivery through at least one of the agreed NLG strategic approaches (scale up, improve quality, increase demand / remove barriers; and strengthen national systems); and
- Consistency with internationally recognised quality standards, such as the Core Humanitarian Standard, Sphere and its companions.⁴⁶

159. By 2018, the NLG had both expanded its focus and became more specific in its goals:

- **Positive and lasting changes** for children and young people in No Lost Generation countries are supported as a result of regional-level strategic efforts to influence decision-makers towards No Lost Generation advocacy objectives. (advocacy)

⁴⁵ “A Lost Generation? – A Strategy for Children Affected by the Syrian Crisis.” October 2013. Page 2.

⁴⁶ “No Lost Generation Update.” January – June 2016. Page 6.

- The funding level for programmes under No Lost Generation pillars in each of the 6 No Lost Generation countries is **at least 60% of appeal target**. (fundraising / accountability)
 - The **voices of children and youth in No Lost Generation countries are raised at all levels** through communications and participation in high level events. (ensuring the voices of children and young people are heard at all levels)
 - **Country level practitioners in No Lost Generation programme areas have access to relevant resources and are guided by strategic frameworks for cross sector programmes**, emerging programme areas and innovations (knowledge management; facilitation of partnerships and other support for cross-sector programming, emerging programme areas and innovation including technology)⁴⁷
160. While these goals are certainly worthy, *prima facie*, they duplicate goals from other regional and strategic plans, individual actors' capacities and core competencies, and management information systems, such as the UNHCR operational portal. Given the prevalence of these and how they are linked to funding mechanisms, it is difficult to conceive how the NLG would deliver on these goals alone. This highlights how the operational model couldn't have been effective (nor efficient) in achieving meaningful influence and change. Given the goals set forth by the time of 2018, it would either need to be competitive with existing structures or largely beholden to them for results.
161. The other aspect of the operating model concerns how it shifted from being UNICEF led to being co-led between UNICEF, Save the Children, Mercy Corps, and World Vision. This was an effective change in that it broadened both the commitment and the resources for the NLG. It also ceased to be "purely" a UNICEF endeavour and while UNICEF should continue to provide leadership, the inclusion of other organisations' expertise and perspective will continue to lend credibility to the NLG and support its agenda moving forward.
162. Finally, the NLG has existed through the contribution of these co-leads, other partners, and some direct funding from committed donors. While the variations in the operating models as the NLG shifted from phase 1 to phase 2 suffered from a lack of focus and a burgeoning number of partners, it did manage to achieve a great deal, either through its reporting, its website, or through the events and activities that were consistently seen as valuable. Despite the lack of focus and the issues this raises in relation to "form follows function," the NLG evolved into a unique initiative that provides value as a form of "think tank" that identifies issues across sectors, organisations, and regionally, and then develops innovative solutions to operating issues that may not be easily addressed by single organisations or through other mechanisms, be they the clusters/sectors or organisations committed to one or another of the pillars, like education, for which there are many. The NLG has proven effective in these areas. Given the relatively minimal direct costs associated with the NLG, this represents not only a degree of efficiency, given the achievements as related to direct resources, but also the possibility for the NLG to achieve more going forward.
163. **Recommendation:** The NLG should continue to function as a secretariat and working group, given a revised focus and function, as recommended in this evaluation. It may consider opening this to qualified local NGOs and other local actors. The NLG should continue to include the UN agencies primarily responsible for coordinating the humanitarian response, e.g. both UNHCR and OCHA. With increased focus and a tiered approach to partnership (See Section 3.2.2), this should represent an effective operating model going forward.
164. **Recommendation:** A revised operating model and focus should be supported through predictable funding for 3 – 5 years. (Please also make reference to Section 3.3.2 immediately below.) This dedicated funding should cover the costs of ½ the co-lead staff costs (the other ½ covered by the co-lead organisations), support for other staff costs (coordinator, communications, data analysis around outcome monitoring, reporting, event facilitation planning, facilitation, and logistics, and administration, et. al.), budget to conduct four "innovation workshops" annually, following the model established by the NLG TechSummit, budget to maintain and expand the No Lost Generation initiative website so that it may serve both the Syria and Iraq crises but also other humanitarian responses, and travel and administrative costs. It is not within the purview of this evaluation to determine the precise costs and level of expertise required for these. However, the potential for the NLG to act as a catalyst for integrated programming that attend to the "whole

⁴⁷ "NLG 2018 Performance Monitoring" & "2018 NLG Workplan." Internal NLG documents. The 2018 NLG Workplan includes additional/complementary goals for phase II: Children and youth have access to certified quality education; Children, including adolescents, benefit from a protective environment; Adolescents and youth are supported to contribute to resilience and social cohesion in their communities; and In line with national legislation frameworks, youth have expanded livelihoods opportunities.

child” and that informs all relevant actors of the outcome level results from such programming, will have a considerable return on any such investments.⁴⁸

3.3.2 What is the value, in fiscal terms, of different aspects of NLG’s work? How should one consider the “return on investment” associated with such an approach? (EQ 3.7)

Value is a difficult subject, even in the private sector. Standard approaches in the private sector assess combinations of assets, liabilities, revenue, and cash flow, with a focus on profit as calculated as “earnings before interest, taxation, depreciation, and amortisation” (EBITDA). This is a first and basic step. Company valuations then look at current and potential profits, with a Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) that “discounts” potential cash flows as based on conservative estimates of what may impede future profits. The correlations between current and potential profits and how much and for what reasons they are “discounted” is the focus of intense negotiations as they result in Net Present Value (NPV) of an organisation or endeavour and form the basis for investment decisions.⁴⁹

In humanitarian action and development cooperation, things are much more complicated. The assessment of value cannot be confined to strict fiscal terms given that there is no quantitative “profit” or “cash flows” related to how to assess return on investment. Instead, it is about how such actions serve different populations’ needs, be they immediate life-saving needs or longer-term developmental needs. The intervening variables that exist in how these needs are met are immense and even the most rigorous approaches, like randomised control trials or multi-variate analysis, are often unable to untangle the attribution between international aid activities and the immediate, short-term, and long-term outcomes for the populations these are meant to serve. This is one of the reasons that, especially in humanitarian action, the focus is on outputs—how many people served by discrete activities, like enrolment in schools, with an assumption that these will lead to improved outcomes.

In relation to the NLG, there have been assumptions that it’s “value” should be calculated on its direct correlation to the scope and quality of programmes. This is problematic, as described in Section 3.3.5, because of the operating contexts in each country and because the NLG was designed as an advocacy platform, partnership, and knowledge sharing forum, etc.—none of which have the direct influence of response plans, donor priorities, organisational mandates, and humanitarian country teams and cluster/sectors on programming decisions and performance.

If one considers the NLG as an “advocacy” platform, one designed to raise the issues and needs of children, youth, and adolescents to a broad audience and to support resource mobilisation for these issues and needs, then formal valuation strategies are even more convoluted. As described in Section 3.2.1, deciphering precise funding levels over time for a response the pace, scale and complexity of those around Syria and Iraq, requires an exceptional degree of financial forensics. Then, attributing which factors influenced funding decisions, from the articulation of needs and priorities to donor priorities to the context in different countries, is complicated.

In terms of other advocacy efforts, there are some standards about how and if advocacy contributes to “tipping points” that create a significant change in policy and programme direction (something that the NLG can be credited with in terms of the focus on education, child protection, and later youth and adolescent programming), coalition building (which the NLG can also be credited with in terms of the partnerships formed, especially after 2016), shaping policy agendas (again, which the NLG can be credited with some influence although intervening variables are immense), influencing attitudes and behaviours, and building social movements.⁵⁰ Yet, to defend the NLG in terms of its value to advocacy is difficult, especially in a crowded and competitive field and in relation to HNO/HRP processes that are the standard for identifying needs and priorities. It is even more difficult to try to establish a return on investment model based on best practices from the private sector. There, the models used for returns on investment associated with marketing and advertising, especially in the era of the internet and social media, are a science unto themselves.

⁴⁸ This recommendation draws on the analysis from throughout this evaluation and thus provides the best way forward in relation to the following evaluation question: “Did the NLG have sufficient human and financial resources to capitalise upon opportunities as they arose?” (EQ 3.6)

⁴⁹ The sources on DCF, NPV, and other valuation strategies are voluminous. For a concise overview of these, please refer to Lutz Kruschwitz and Andreas Loeffler, *Discounted Cash Flow: A Theory of the Valuation of Firms*. Wiley; 2005.

⁵⁰ The value of knowledge sharing is even more difficult to calculate on its own and so it is not treated here. In most cases, the value of knowledge sharing must be combined with other efforts, e.g. knowledge accumulation and dissemination in relation to advocacy goals, for instance. As described in Section 3.4, the evaluation positions the website and other knowledge sharing aspects of the NLG in relation to the analysis and dissemination of outcome level results, best and emerging practices, and the potential return on investment of NLG operational/programming solutions as described in this section.

Regardless, one should consider the NLG’s direct costs and how, even in in rough estimation, these compare to potential value. The table below shows the direct costs for the NLG from 2016 – 2019.⁵¹

NLG Direct Costs	2016	2017	2018	2019	Sub-Totals
Salaries					
UNICEF	200,000	235,000	266,000	283,000	984,000
Mercy Corps		20,000	27,000	35,000	82,000
World Vision	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	80,000
Save the Children					0
Sub-totals:	220,000	275,000	313,000	338,000	1,146,000
Events					
World Humanitarian Summit	4,500				4,500
NLG Tech Summits/2017 ED Tech Summit/2017 Tech Task Force for A&Y		48,000	60,000	180,000	288,000
Brussels Conferences		1,000	2,000	1,400	4,400
side-event: 72nd UN General Assembly		60,000			60,000
NLG evidence symposium 2018			140,000		140,000
Interagency Syria Crisis Child Protection Regional Workshop for WoS and 3RP			25,000		25,000
Helsinki conference		2,500			2,500
Mashreq committee of the EU Parliament		1,200			1,200
Donor briefings			7,400	400	7,800
Sub-totals:	4,500	112,700	234,400	181,800	533,400
Other					
Website			14,000		14,000
TOTALS:	USD 224,500	USD 387,700	USD 561,400	USD 519,800	USD 1,693,400

This table shows that total direct costs for the NLG between 2016 and 2019 were approximately USD 1,693,400. Given the lack of salary information for Save the Children and other potentially missing direct costs, this can be estimated upwards of USD 1.8 million. In consideration of percentage of funding, the highest percentage of funding went to salaries (58%). Figure 19 shows these percentages, along with the total amount spent over the period for the Tech Summit activities, as a subset of the total events’ costs.

While USD 1.8 million is significant, this needs to be compared with other financial figures. In comparing the NLG’s total costs for 2018 (the highest costs across the period) with the funding received for only education in the 2018 SHARP (USD 113.5 million⁵²) and 3RP (482 million⁵³), or USD 595.5 million in total, then the percentage of NLG direct costs as compared to this total investment in education for 2018 is 0.094%, or less than one tenth of one percent.




Figure 19: Percentage of direct costs per categories; total Tech Summit and related costs are included as a subset of total events’ costs.

⁵¹ There were minimal direct costs prior to 2016. All figures are in USD. Costs are based on those provided by the NLG. Salary costs for Save the Children were not available and are likely to be similar to those for the other INGO partners. There are other events and activities that the NLG conducted but for which there were no direct costs. A table with all of these is available in the Annexes Section 13.

⁵² OCHA FTS.

⁵³ 3RP website.

The costs of the clusters could be an interesting comparative—although, as noted in this evaluation, the NLG should not be seen as a coordination mechanism—although deciphering the costs of the clusters would require a level of financial analysis and financial forensics that goes beyond the capacity of this evaluation.⁵⁴

Given the dearth of standards for calculating value, return on investment, advocacy, and comparatives to other costs, one is left with a judgement call. Given the analysis in this evaluation and other considerations, is an annual cost of around USD 600,000 justifiable for the NLG? The evaluation cannot arrive at a substantive, fiscally-based, analysis of this.

However, the evaluation also recommends that the NLG shift its focus to identifying cross-sector, cross-organisation, solutions to operational and other problems that cannot be easily addressed by others. The NLG Tech Summits have proven the NLG’s capacity to bring together technologists, the private sector, and humanitarian actors to develop viable solutions to such problems. If one considers the total costs of the Tech Summits to date (USD 288,000) and/or the total costs for the NLG in any year, these could be compared with the direct value these would have if implemented by different humanitarian actors.

In this way, the value of the NLG could be measured in real terms going forward, e.g. the development of solutions that are then taken up in various programmes and whether or not these contribute to results. Of course, if and when this occurs, attribution will remain an issue. Implementing organisations will claim credit for agreeing to the solution and implementing it, perhaps adapting it to various needs. How much can then be credited to the NLG or the implementing organisation will remain an issue and yet the value of such approaches is not only a highly valued and regular feature of the private sector—and government, for that matter—that the value is seldom in doubt. Again, what would make the NLG potentially different from the likes of the Brookings Institution, as an example, is that it would have more of an operational focus, as compared to a policy focus. In this sense, it is more akin to McKinsey or Boston Consulting Group. In comparison to these, not only would the NLG be cheaper, it would also have a very distinct focus and real-term results that could be measured.

Conclusion: The NLG’s influence and value are most aligned with advocacy, e.g. the ability to influence tipping points that create a significant change in policy and programme direction, coalition building, shaping policy agendas, influencing attitudes and behaviours, and building social movements. However, the value of these and direct attribution between the NLG and programming results—the primary metric for value—remain elusive. The NLG could start to compare the cost of developing various solutions, using the costs of the Tech Summit to date as a baseline/standard, and compare this to the relative value of their implementation by different organisations. This would move beyond advocacy, and even a think tank model, toward a form of highlight specialised management consultancy whose value is based on the solutions it provides clients, e.g. implementing organisations.

⁵⁴ For a study of how the clusters are funded, see: Abby Stoddard, Adele Harmer, Katherine Haver, Dirk Salomons, and Victoria Wheeler; “Cluster Approach Evaluation.” OCHA; November 2007. No other more recent study on the subject was identified.

3.3.3 How efficient was the NLG Secretariat chaired by UNICEF? How efficient was the role of UNICEF as a lead? In what ways, could that role be made more efficient? (EQ 3.2)

165. Efficiency implies that the fewest resources are used to achieve quality results and to time. While an adequate level of financial analysis in this regard goes beyond the remit of the evaluation, there are clear indications of efficiency overall. Some of these are detailed in Section 3.3.1.

166. In relation to the role of UNICEF as chair of the secretariat, respondents to the evaluation were positive. (Figure 20.)




Figure 20: Qualitative evidence: How efficient was the NLG Secretariat chaired by UNICEF? How efficient was the role of UNICEF as a lead? (EQ 3.2; organisational cohorts)

167. Organisational cohorts were exceptionally positive, citing various ways that the NLG works across different parties to deliver valuable information and activities.

168. There was some variance amongst geographic cohorts. At the regional level, many cite the role of UNICEF as being “too dominant” and to the imbalance between organisations with resources to “push things through” compared to those with fewer resources.

169. Nearly all respondents cite the effectiveness of the secretariat. As one respondent stated: “The secretariat has been managed extremely well and left a lot of room for organisations to get the most out of the NLG.”




Figure 21: Qualitative evidence: How efficient was the NLG Secretariat chaired by UNICEF? How efficient was the role of UNICEF as a lead? (EQ 3.2; geographic cohorts)



170. Conclusion: The NLG must have a realistic and focused purpose to ensure that any and all resources are used efficiently. At the same time, the NLG Secretariat and UNICEF’s role have been instrumental to the NLG’s success.

171. UNICEF largely initiated the NLG, with immediate commitments for the NLG Coordinator in the first phase and with subsequent support thereafter. While one may understand the need to broaden the focus to include other organisations with expertise in the three pillars and a commitment to the NLG’s goals, the role of UNICEF should not be diminished. It is also well placed to continue to provide resources, be they human and knowledge-based, that can further the NLG’s goals.

3.3.4 At global and regional level, what were the advantages of agencies' collaboration as an NLG coalition, compared to individual agencies' responses to the crises as it affects children and young people in the affected countries, especially for advocacy and resource mobilization? (EQ 3.4)

172. Given the issues set forth in the rest of this evaluation, the NLG was limited in how it could influence humanitarian actors' responses regionally and globally. Respondents across NLG partners and others do cite various advantages and disadvantages associated with being part of the NLG coalition.

173. Overall, a large majority of respondents were positive about the NLG as a coalition of partners regionally. Most cite the NLG's capacity to put an early spotlight on the issues of education and child protection internationally and on its capacity to act as a catalyst for resource mobilisation. As elsewhere, few make the immediate link to youth and adolescent programming and, when they do, they state that it came into focus "late."




Figure 22: Qualitative evidence: At global and regional level - what were the advantages of agencies' collaboration as an NLG coalition? (EQ 3.4; geographic cohorts)

174. Donors are particularly positive amongst organisational cohorts. They state that, especially early on, the NLG provided a message that they could use in capitals and that it aligned well with other efforts to raise the issue of education in emergencies.




Figure 23: Qualitative evidence: At global and regional level - what were the advantages of agencies' collaboration as an NLG coalition? (EQ 3.4; organisational cohorts)

175. While most respondents remarked on the early phase of the NLG as being important in creating international attention, many also comment on the activities that the NLG has engaged in since 2016. They remark positively on the event for GBV and the growing attention to youth and adolescent programming and nearly all who participated in the Tech Summit state that it was exceptionally valuable.

176. Negative comments tended to concern the "dominance" of some organisations with the stature and/or resources to push for certain priorities. (See Section 3.3.1.)



177. Conclusion: The NLG is valuable as a regional forum that brings organisations together around the issues of children's needs and rights.

178. The advantage of the NLG regionally is to bring together organisations committed to the three programming areas set forth by the NLG. In fact, there are few regional forums like the NLG, with most occurring at the country level and in relation to the SHARP and 3RP.

3.3.5 At country level, to what extent has the initiative contributed to better programming? (EQ 3.5)

179. Given the analysis throughout this evaluation, there is little direct correlation between the NLG and improved programming at the country level. This is confirmed through qualitative evidence. Unlike perceptions of the NLG’s benefit at the regional level, with respect to the country level, respondents were more negative.

180. As Figure 24 and Figure 25 show, a large majority of respondents are either negative or neutral about the NLG’s contributions at the country level.

181. Respondents from both Jordan and Lebanon cite the inability of the NLG to address the complexities of the country context, especially as strategies moved towards transition and sustainability. (See Section 3.5.2.)




Figure 24: Qualitative evidence: At country level: To what extent did being part of the initiative contribute to better programming? (EQ 3.5; geographic cohorts)

182. Turkey is largely ambivalent about the NLG, citing the size and relative sophistication of the government. There is some link between the early response and how events evolved with the government. As GoT and other respondents from Turkey state, the notions of a “lost generation” resonated with most parties, aligning with existing priorities and strategies, and yet the size and relative sophistication of the GoT limited the direct impact the NLG could have.

183. Respondents from Lebanon were slightly more positive. They cited links between the NLG and how the involvement with government, particularly MEHE, evolved. While attribution is elusive, the focus on education certainly mirrored the intentions of the NLG, and Lebanon’s RACE exemplifies this.




Figure 25: Qualitative evidence: At country level: To what extent did being part of the initiative contribute to better programming? (EQ 3.5; organisational cohorts)

184. Respondents were mixed at the organisational cohort level, except for donors who were negative. Donors expressed dissatisfaction with the notion that the NLG should affect programming at all. They cite the way that funding decisions are made—to agencies, to the 3RP, and according to their own priorities. In fact, all funding decisions described by the NLG are not to the NLG, certainly, and not to the actual “plans,” e.g. to the SHARP or 3RP, but to individual organisations. This inevitably includes some negotiation about what will be achieved, how and when, and would not include the NLG in any way. Because of the confusion about the NLG’s purpose in this regard, donors expressed some concerns that the NLG was duplicative, basically seeing the NLG as a regional coordination system that would not mesh with existing country level architecture.



185. **Conclusion:** The NLG did not have significant contributions to country level programming, nor should it be expected to do so. It was intended as an advocacy platform and evolved into a partnership that addresses issues associated with the NLG's three pillars. The NLG should avoid being seen as a regional "coordination" mechanism, as many respondents said it was intended, as this would duplicate existing mechanisms.

186. At the same time, the ability for NLG partners to work together at the regional level and on issues that programming does, inherently, provide an impetus for better programming at the country level. This link needs to be made more concrete going forward.

187. **Recommendation:** The NLG initiative should focus on identifying issues concerning integrated approaches that are appearing across country contexts and across multiple partners. NLG partners at the regional level should then agree with their country offices as to which issues warrant being treated by the NLG, either as an operational research question or as an issue to be explored in an "innovation workshop."

188. These may be issues like early child marriage, or issues affecting youths and adolescents, or be more focused on operational issues, like work with government and civil society. They should be cross-country and cross-partner and have a direct operational focus.

3.4 Platform for Sharing Knowledge

189. While the evaluation questions for this section concern the NLG as a coordination mechanism, these do not adequately address the NLG as a platform for sharing knowledge. While the evaluation explored the ways in which the NLG formed as a partnership after 2016, especially in Sections 3.2.1, this occurred alongside a significant expansion of the NLG as a generator and repository of knowledge.

190. The NLG did develop a foundation of information, be it aggregate data around needs across the three pillars, or a growing set of primary research related to cross-cutting issues affecting education, child protection, and youth and adolescent programming. The NLG website is coherent, focused, and provides a plethora of these materials on-line. While one may have argued in 2016 that an investment in an on-line database, and other knowledge products, might not be clearly aligned with the NLG's primary purpose, the foundation for this is now in place.

191. **Recommendation:** The NLG should continue to invest in the No Lost Generation website to highlight outcome level results, NLG developed solutions and innovations, and as a repository of knowledge for the region and for other humanitarian responses. As the NLG refines its focus, the website can be used to share outcome level results associated with integrated programming, something current HRPs do not adequately accomplish, and on emerging best practices. The website, along with other advocacy/communication materials, should focus on international actors, and primarily donors, as its audience. (See also Section 3.3.1 concerning investments in this area.)

3.4.1 What is the value added of the NLG as a "coordination mechanism"? (EQ 4.2)

192. The NLG was never set forth as a coordination mechanism. In the first phase, the operating model was designed to incorporate the NLG into the existing SHRP/3RP cluster/sector models. After 2016, it expanded into a partnership that did not seek to "coordinate" partner efforts but to instead share knowledge and best/emerging practices around the three pillars and to agree upon specific NLG activities.

193. The confusion, nonetheless, is understandable. NLG Annual Reports and other materials focus on the results and remaining gaps in the three pillars and for each 3RP country, Syria, and Iraq. The shifting goals and operating models for the NLG contributed to this confusion, even if the NLG was incorporated as a distinct element in regional and country level plans.



194. **Conclusion:** The NLG is not a coordination mechanism and so it adds little value as such. In its best sense, it is an advocacy platform with the potential to promote emerging best practices in relation to integrated approaches to child protection, education, and youth and adolescent programming.

195. Confusion about the NLG as a coordination mechanism will be reduced by a clearer and tighter focus, concentrating on international humanitarian actors as the primary audience for its work, on outcome-level results from integrated programming (rather than discrete output level needs), and by serving as a type of "think tank" for emerging best practices around programming for the "whole child". (See Section 3.1.4.)

3.4.2 To what extent was the NLG initiative's implementation coordinated with other relevant initiatives at all levels, such as Whole of Syria Forum for example? Are there any overlaps or existing gaps? (EQ 4.4)⁵⁵

196. Given that most coordination occurred through other mechanisms, there is limited evidence of how the NLG had direct, tangible, links with other initiatives. The NLG did provide inputs into regional and country level plans, including the SHARP and 3RP. (See Section 3.2.1.)

Whole of Syria Approach

197. As led by OCHA, the Whole of Syria (WoS) approach provides a common response plan and a supporting coordination structure for inside Syria and regarding cross-border operations and amongst 270 international and national actors.

198. Unlike other coordination structures, the WoS includes coordination between hubs with joint geographic presence to avoid duplication, ensure complementarity, enhance collaboration between clusters, increase information sharing between hubs, and create opportunities for joint planning.

199. As noted in Section 3.2.1, the primary focus of the WoS approach has been on life-saving activities, including food security, nutrition, and shelter.

200. As in other areas, while the NLG did draw from and provide data and information for the WoS, it did not include substantive inputs into this coordination structure.




Figure 26: Whole of Syria coordination structure. Source: OCHA.

Education Cannot Wait Fund

201. Established during the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016, “Education Cannot Wait” is an international initiative that could be linked with the NLG.

202. Hosted by UNICEF, it is a global fund to transform the delivery of education in emergencies, aimed at linking governments, humanitarian actors, and development efforts towards the educational needs of children and youth affected by crises. The fund aims to reach all crisis-affected children and youth with safe, free, and quality education by 2030.

⁵⁵ This section also answers Evaluation Question 5.3: “How, if, and when did the NLG make links to country, regional, and international forums related to education, child protection, and youth and adolescent programming? Were possible links missed and, if so, what was the consequence of such missed opportunities?”

203. Denmark is the leading donor in the Education Cannot Wait fund, mobilising USD 336 million from 14 donors. The Education Cannot Wait fund is aligned with Sustainable Development Goal 4 that seeks to “ensure that inclusive and equitable quality education for all children and youth.”⁵⁶

INEE

204. The International Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) is another initiative dedicated to education in emergency responses. It is a network of more than 15,000 individual members and 130 partner organisations in 190 countries.⁵⁷ It includes four priorities:

- To serve as a global advocate and thought leader, promoting education for all and in all circumstances.
- To foster the strengthening of the evidence base through partnerships that inform research, policy, and practice across humanitarian and development contexts.
- To increase the availability and accessibility of knowledge and information which builds upon and improves capacities to deliver education for all.
- To foster an engaged, inclusive and diverse membership, and build strategic partnerships to achieve all other strategic priorities.⁵⁸



205. **Conclusion:** There are a myriad of initiatives related to education and child protection and to which the NLG could have some bearing, be they regional, like the Whole of Syria approach, or international efforts that grew out of the World Humanitarian Summit and the Sustainable Development Goals. Yet, regional and country level coordination structures are complicated by their respective operating contexts and other international efforts and, at least to date, tend to focus on education without the integrated approaches promoted by the NLG. Given this, the NLG performs a distinct role in promoting and advancing how integrated approaches to child protection, education, and youth and adolescent programming deliver better outcome level results and in identifying best/emerging practices on how to do this. The NLG will still draw from and add to other forums although its role should be considered distinct.

206. The NLG should certainly provide, and draw from, data and information from other initiatives regionally and globally, but its competitive advantage is as a regional forum linked to integrated approaches and the identification of and investigation into operational issues that cut across education, child protection and youth and adolescent programming. The NLG should remain a conduit to and from such initiatives and yet, by focusing on its comparative and competitive advantages, it has distinct value as an initiative that addresses the needs of the whole child.

3.4.3 At country level - were there any NLG coordination mechanisms and if so - how efficiently did they work? If not - why not? (EQ 4.3)

207. NLG coordination mechanisms were not formalised at the country level, especially given the dominance of traditional coordination mechanisms. See Section 3.3.1 for more on the first phase operating model that did attempt to integrate the NLG into country level coordination mechanisms.

3.4.4 To what extent did the NLG initiative contribute to fostering synergies and avoiding overlaps/incoherent approaches between different sectors and partners? (EQ 4.1)

208. This question is answered in Sections 3.2.1, 3.3.1, 3.3.5, and 3.4.1. Please also refer to the qualitative evidence for this question in the Annexes. (Section 6.4.)

⁵⁶ For more, visit the Education Cannot Wait website, at: <http://www.educationcannotwait.org/>.

⁵⁷ For more, visit the INEE website, at: <https://www.ineesite.org/en/>.

⁵⁸ “Strategic Plan, 2015 – 2017.” The Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE). Page 6.

3.5 Connectedness

3.5.1 How does the NLG initiative relate to UNICEF's Gender Action Plan (GAP) and other frameworks related to gender equality and human rights-based approaches? (EQ 5.1)⁵⁹

209. The UNICEF Gender Action Plan (GAP) for 2018 – 2021 sets out an approach to gender equality and women’s empowerment that are seen as essential for realising the rights of the child. This identifies how gender and the empowerment and wellbeing of girls is integral to each of UNICEF’s strategic goals. (Figure 27) The plan includes annual reports, the latest being 2017. This includes the strategic context globally and results by programme area, amongst other information.




Figure 27: From UNICEF’s Gender Action Plan (GAP) for 2018 – 2021.

210. In relation to the NLG, the GAP is a potential model for how to link output-level results, that the NLG has covered well since its inception, to outcome-level results. For instance, the same report provides a model for how output-level activities combine to support the empowerment of adolescent girls. (Figure 28)



Figure 28: Empowerment of adolescent girls. Source: UNICEF Annual Results Report 2017: Gender Equality; page 11.

211. The NLG is aligned with this, in that a focus on education and child protection are integral to UNICEF’s strategic goals that link the issues of gender equality and girls and women’s empowerment together.

⁵⁹ The evaluation question was specifically related to the UNICEF GAP, as agreed in the inception phase. This is not meant to mean that analysis and comparisons with other gender action plans, frameworks, or strategies would not be useful. It was simply the agreed upon focus for this evaluation.

212. The NLG is not aligned in relation to specific activities around gender (see Sections 3.1.1) and in the way that the GAP provides an integrated view to gender and empowerment.



213. Conclusion: The NLG is aligned at an output-level with the GAP. It can be strengthened by using the GAP as a model for an outcome-level results framework that shows how and why integrated approaches provide better results than they do alone.

214. This is especially relevant for the NLG because of the proposed focus on integrated, outcome-level results, and also because the NLG can do this across partner organisations (UN, NGO, and others). This could represent something relatively unique—the ability to capture results, lessons, and emerging best practices and how different organisations work together to do so. This is not a “consortium” model where different partners come together under a single ToR. Instead, it looks at issues more organically, pointing out both problems and successes, be they how a UN organisation works with governments in ways that may hinder or support NGO activities, or how different local and international NGOs tackle the same issue, albeit in different ways.

215. Recommendation: The NLG may continue to make reference to output level results across the pillars, as is done currently, but should expand upon these to identify and document outcome level results that highlight emerging or best practices in relation to child protection, education, and youth and adolescent programming, and how different organisations work together on these.

3.5.2 How did the NLG consider both the short-term emergency needs of children, youth, and adolescents as well as longer-term programming and development needs in these areas at the country level? Did it influence different actors to consider the short and long term needs of children, youth and adolescents? (EQ 5.2)⁶⁰

216. While the NLG identified short-term needs, both in its initial call to action and subsequently in its annual reports and other materials, longer-term needs were not addressed in the early phase of the NLG. In Phase II, after 2016, longer-term needs were addressed through various events and activities that focused on issues that impacted the long-term well-being of children, like GBV and early marriage.

217. The NLG, because of its lack of a tangible and practical links to country level programming (See Section 3.3.5), did not have much bearing on how the emergency response has transitioned along the humanitarian development nexus. Sustainable programming aligned with government plans is highly diverse in the region.

218. In Turkey, this is basically how the response progressed from the earliest arrival of refugees there.

219. In Lebanon, the proportion of refugees to the total population overwhelmed services there and the international community stepped in to work with Ministries to address these needs.

220. In Jordan, most of the focus in the early phases of the response were on the camps and then shifted once Jordan enacted the Jordan Response Plan.

221. Egypt’s needs were much smaller and so it was a combination of direct action and government led-support.

222. And, in Iraq, the needs were exceptionally complicated by the displacement of huge urban communities that overwhelmed the services that had already been provided for refugees from Syria. There, the response was aligned with the GoI, the Coalition, and the UNCT, who recognised that services to displaced persons, especially as designed to facilitate their return home, was directly aligned with the credibility and stability of the GoI. How and where the NLG could have fit, from a regional level, into these complicated country contexts, is somewhat unfathomable.

223. Given these issues and ways in which the humanitarian response transitions toward more sustained programming, the NLG did little except to cite output level needs for education, child protection, and youth and adolescent programming. This made sense given the urgency of a “lost generation” and yet there may have been opportunities to make the links between these short-term emergency needs and the longer-term programming objectives, especially as they were articulated in government led strategies.

⁶⁰ This section also answers the evaluation question 7.2: “In the participating countries, to what extent did NLG contribute to (or impeded) transition to sustainable long-term solutions to meeting the educational, protection and participation needs of children and youth?”



224. **Conclusion:** The NLG is, in essence, an approach that takes into account the short- and long-term needs of children. However, it was never positioned to have a direct bearing on how different responses transitioned along the humanitarian development nexus. It may do so through more focus on outcome level results while remaining mostly concerned with the needs of all children during an emergency.

225. As recommended in Sections 3.1.4 and 3.5.1, the NLG will be able to provide more substantive links to longer-term programming through a focus on outcome-level results. This will provide a basis for assessing what is contributing to quality and what issues should be considered by these longer-term plans.
226. At the same time, the NLG should not diminish its focus on an integrated approach to the needs of children in a humanitarian response. The NLG, in essence, should remain a catalyst for ensuring that the protection and education needs of all children are met during an emergency.

3.6 *Intended & Unintended Results (Impact)*⁶¹

3.6.1 *What changes, relevant to children and young people affected by the conflict, does NLG initiative appear to have contributed to? (EQ 6.2)*

227. It is difficult to untangle the attribution of the NLG in promoting and delivering upon quality education and child protection programming from the fact that the region's population was already highly literate and with near universal access to primary education before the Syria crisis; the fact that many donors were already prioritising education in emergency contexts; the coordination and appeal mechanisms; the enormous political upheaval all around the response, including anti-refugee sentiment in Europe; the rise of ISIL and the conflict in Iraq; the shift to a more sustainable development focus, especially in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey; and the current status inside Syria with reconstruction efforts. In all of this, did the NLG have an impact?
228. Respondents to this evaluation say that it did although they are hard pressed to point to direct correlations between the NLG and tangible results at country level. This isn't surprising. As many commented, the notion of a whole child approach was not new, and many organisations recognised that the best results come from an integrated approach to education and child protection. As some local NGOs commented, "Well, of course, that's how we've been approaching the issue for decades." So then, what was the NLG's impact?
229. The NLG enabled a broad consensus, from the highest levels of the UN and governments, for huge investments to be sought to prevent hundreds of thousands of children "lost." No one could deny this basic message. If the international community didn't act, these children would be lost. This not only helped to focus humanitarian action, but also gave voice to these children so that many, many others could not turn away from the Syria crisis.
230. Even as the resonance of the NLG as a "message" dissipated, the NLG evolved to bring together partners, affiliates, champions, and youth, toward its focus on child protection, education, and youth and adolescent programming. In this, the NLG garnered significant good will—respondents were almost annoyingly positive about the NLG's activities, events, and materials. Annoying because one could inevitably point at the results, with 2.8 million children out of school in Syria in 2018 and approximately 252,000 out of school in 3RP countries, despite the huge investments there. These figures might make the most stalwart supporter question the value of the NLG initiative. Yet, people across the region and beyond still support the NLG.
231. **Conclusion:** The combination of the impact the NLG has had in relation to the Syria and Iraq crises--as a catalyst early on, as a reminder of international commitments thereafter, and as a galvanising force for regional and international actors committed to the rights of the child, all with considerable good will and commitment--should not be underestimated.
232. It is understandable that many might have expected more from the NLG. Many respondents state that it should have had a direct impact on resource mobilisation, that it should have had a direct impact on the quality and scope of programming, and that, as a result, the needs of children, adolescents, and youth

⁶¹ The rest of the Evaluation covers the question 6.3: "Were there any unintended positive or negative effects of the initiative, either on the response to the Syria and Iraq crises at country level or on NLG partners at global and regional level, and if so what were these?"

would have been better met across the region. However, this belies the fact that the NLG was, at its inception, a clarion call to action and that it did serve this purpose. It also confuses how the international community and governments responded to the sheer scale, pace and complexity of the crisis with what such an “initiative” could reasonably achieve. The initial impact of the NLG did prompt its continuation, after 2016, as a partnership forum and platform for sharing knowledge. This was an awkward fit because it was not clear how this would lead to better results and how this was aligned with the other coordination and appeal efforts across the crises. Nonetheless, the work the NLG did after was of value—it provided a way to keep the issues of integrated approaches to child protection, education, and youth and adolescent programming at the forefront of the response, and with increasing effect, it addressed issues, through events, research, and materials, that were integral to these.

233. Now, the NLG has the opportunity to not continue to serve its initial purpose, as a “rallying cry” rather than, perhaps, a “clarion call,” because of the exceptional work it has done to date. With a renewed focus on integrated programming, the rights of the child and the effects of gender equality and women’s empowerment, and as an “incubator” and “think tank” for developing solutions to cross-sector, cross-organisation operational issues, it will have broad impact on how actors serve the needs of all children.

4 Conclusions

This section includes abbreviated versions of the conclusions included throughout the rest of the evaluation. They are included here for ease of reference. They include reference to the specific evaluation questions and relevant section of the report.

4.1 Relevance

1. The NLG is fully aligned with the rights of children and young people and this should be its driving focus going forward. (EQ 1.1; Section 3.1.1.)
2. The NLG consistently identified gaps in funding and needs to relevant actors throughout the response. By 2016, it was integral to regional (3RP) and country level (SHARP) response plans. (EQ 1.2; Section 3.1.2.)
3. The NLG stands as a model for an integrated approach to the needs of all children in a humanitarian response and as aligned with the CRC. If the NLG focuses on its core message of avoiding a “lost generation,” and activities, research, and analysis on the outcomes associated with a “whole child” approach, amongst other activities, it can certainly serve other humanitarian responses. (EQ 1.4; Section 3.1.2.)

4.2 Effectiveness

4. The NLG influenced funding levels, especially earlier in the response and in relation to youth and adolescent programming later. This was the case in host countries where funding levels in education, particularly, grew to unprecedented levels, but less so in Syria where education was not prioritised and where funding for total requirements remained low in comparison with 3RP countries. (EQ 2.1; Section 3.2.1.)
5. The NLG never had the mechanisms to directly influence the scope or quality of programming and so its influence here was minimal. While efforts after 2016 to have events and materials on various relevant issues were received well, there was no real way to link these with actual operational strategies and plans at the country level. (EQ 2.1; Section 3.2.1.)
6. The NLG’s influence on policy and legal frameworks has have been understandably minimal. (EQ 2.1; Section 3.2.1.)
7. The NLG should continue to foster partnerships across a broad array of actors while clarifying its role as an advocacy platform for resource mobilisation (primarily), focusing on outcome level results, and conducting “innovation workshops” on performance issues that impede integrated approaches to the “whole child.” (EQ 2.2; Section 3.2.2.)
8. While the NLG is aligned with the rights of the child (CRC), it could do more to incorporate gender equality and women’s empowerment as integral to effective child protection and education approaches. (EQ 2.3; Section 3.2.3.)

4.3 Efficiency

9. The NLG operating model was first meant to be integrated into existing coordination structures and then, in phase two, it developed as a partnership and knowledge sharing platform. These made sense at the time, but the second operating model could be strengthened going forward. (EQ 3.1; Section 3.3.1.)
10. The NLG must have a realistic and focused purpose to ensure that any and all resources are used efficiently. At the same time, the NLG secretariat and UNICEF’s role have been instrumental to the NLG’s success. (EQ 3.2; Section 3.3.2.)
11. The NLG’s influence and value are most aligned with advocacy, e.g. the ability of an initiative to influence tipping points that create a significant change in policy and programme direction, coalition building, shaping policy agendas, influencing attitudes and behaviours, and building social movements. However, the value of these and direct attribution between the NLG and programming results—the primary metric for value—remain elusive. The NLG could start to compare the cost of developing various solutions, using the costs of the Tech Summit as a baseline/standard, and compare this to the real value of their implementation by different organisations. (EQ 3.7; Section 3.3.2.)
12. The NLG is valuable as a regional forum that brings organisations together around the issues of children’s needs and rights. (EQ 3.4; Section 0.)

13. The NLG did not have significant contributions to country level programming, nor should it be expected to do so. It was intended as an advocacy platform and evolved to be a partnership to addresses issues associated with the NLG’s three pillars. The NLG should avoid being seen as a regional “coordination” mechanism, as many respondents said it was, as this would duplicate existing mechanisms. (EQ 3.5; Section 3.3.5.)

4.4 Platform for Sharing Knowledge

14. The NLG is not a coordination mechanism and so it adds little value as such. In its best sense, it is an advocacy platform with the potential to promote emerging best practices in relation to integrated child protection, education, and youth and adolescent programming and with a focus on all children, youth, and adolescents. (EQ 4.2; Section 3.4.1.)
15. There are a myriad of initiatives related to education and child protection and to which the NLG could have some bearing, be they regional, like the Whole of Syria approach, or international efforts that grew out of the World Humanitarian Summit and as related to the Sustainable Development Goals. Yet, regional and country level coordination structures are complicated by their respective operating contexts and other international efforts, at least to date, and tend to focus on education without the integrated approaches fostered and promoted by the NLG. Given this, the NLG performs a distinct role in promoting and advancing how integrated approaches to child protection, education, and youth and adolescent programming deliver better outcome results and in identifying best/emerging practices on how to do this. The NLG will still draw from and add to these other regional and international forums although its role should be considered distinct. (EQ 4.4; Section 3.4.2.)

4.5 Connectedness

16. The NLG is aligned at an output level with the UNICEF Gender Action Plan (GAP). It can be strengthened by using the GAP as a model for an outcome-level results framework that shows how and why integrated approaches provide better results than they do alone. (EQ 5.1; Section 3.5.1.)
17. The NLG is, in essence, an approach that takes into account the short- and long-term needs of children. However, it was never positioned to have a direct bearing on how different responses transition along the humanitarian development nexus. (EQ 5.2; Section 3.5.2.)

4.6 Intended & Unintended Results (Impact)

18. The combination of the impact the NLG has had in relation to the Syria and Iraq crises--as a catalyst early on, as a reminder of international commitments thereafter, and as a galvanising force for regional and international actors committed to the rights of the child, all with considerable good will and commitment--should not be underestimated. (EQ 5.2; Section 3.5.2.)

5 Recommendations

234. The recommendations presented below are taken from the rest of the evaluation. Unless otherwise directed, these are intended for the NLG and should be considered as all important for the NLG going forward. In fact, *all* the recommendations present different aspects and considerations for a broader model for the NLG. They include reference to specific evaluation questions and the corresponding section of the report.

5.1 Relevance

1. **Develop a model for the NLG that builds on its partnerships, highlights outcome level results, identifies best/emerging practices associated with integrated programming, uses succinct core messaging for advocacy, continues to advocate for human rights programming, and uses its existing assets and competitive advantages as a regional forum to develop innovative solutions to cross-sector, cross-organisation operational problems related to integrated programming.** (EQ 1.4; Section 3.1.2.)

In brief, this includes:

- ✓ Build partnerships with a diverse range of actors who are committed to the key messages and integrated approach proffered by the NLG. (Already accomplished by the NLG in the Syria response.)
- ✓ Draw on partners' operational experience to draw out best/emerging practices, always with a focus on the integration between education, child protection, and youth and adolescent programming.
- ✓ Compile and analyse existing data, highlighting gaps, across the three pillars, as has been done to date. The NLG should take this a step further, going beyond output level data for each pillar and include analysis on outcome level results associated with integrated programming.⁶²
- ✓ As based on outcome level results data, identify performance constraints or other issues that may be impeding results across multiple actors and then conduct "innovation workshops" that bring together diverse actors to develop specific and practical operational solutions designed to increase results. These could then be piloted/tested by different NLG partners at the country level and with a focus on efficacy and activities' capacity to be replicated and/or brought to scale.
- ✓ While the value of the NLG will include advocacy, knowledge sharing, and a regional focus on integrated programming approaches, precise value, or return on investment, can also be measured by the solutions it develops, how these are then implemented by organisations at the country level, and how these contribute to better results. While the attribution for such results will need to be shared with the implementing organisations—and calculations for how much can be attributed to the NLG and how much to such implementing organisations will undoubtedly be hard to calculate—a formula for the precise value of such solutions can be calculated and whatever may be attributed to the NLG is bound to be greater than the direct costs of the NLG. (See Section 3.3.2.)

This represents a specific model that may be taken forward in relation to the Syria and Iraq crises and other humanitarian responses. This model is expanded upon, with additional recommendations, throughout the evaluation.

⁶² A similar recommendation, although more linked to output level data and links to the 3RP and SRP, was recommended in "No Lost Generation Initiative: A visioning document for 2015-2018." Pages 23, 24.

5.2 Effectiveness

- 2. Create partnership tiers with an expanded secretariat/working group, semi-annual partnership meetings, and an annual event to “showcase” NLG results and to give a platform for youths and adolescents.** (EQ 2.2; Section 3.2.2.)

The NLG may also consider a tiered approach to partnership. The **first tier** may include those that co-chair the NLG. (See Section 3.3.2.)

The **second tier** should include partners that actively provide integrated programming solutions across the pillars and who are committed to the NLG as a platform for identifying best/emerging practices and to compiling and publicising outcome-level results data. This tier of partnership should include the largest actors in regard to integrated programming, thus providing the best foundation for identifying best/emerging practices. This tier would also commit resources, human and/or financial (ideally both), as a way to bolster their regular engagement in the NLG, including regular meetings, events, dissemination of outcome-level results data, “innovation workshops” to identify operational solutions, and in the piloting/testing of such operational solutions. (See Section 3.3.1 for more on the proposed funding model.)

Potential Annual Cycle of Meetings for Different Partnership Tiers

Monthly Secretariat Meetings (1st tier)

- Overall management and planning
- Administrative and finance
- Outcome level results data tracking

Semi-Annual Partnership Meetings (1st & 2nd tiers)

- Outcome levels results review
- Identification of best/emerging practices
- Discussion/agreement on workshop topics

Annual Event (All+ Donors)

- Reporting on “innovation workshops”
- Children, Youth and Adolescents Voices
- Showcase of NLG results/Annual Report

The **third tier** should include partners that commit to the NLG messages and approach and that can provide different levels of support given their interest, priorities, and available resources.

As done currently, the NLG should also continue to focus on a mix of UN organisations and INGOs, including opening the forum to national NGOs or other local actors. The inclusion of civil society or government actors could be considered although, as direct recipients of aid, their priorities and needs may go beyond what the NLG could support.

This should also be done in ways that reflect the availability of key stakeholders, other workshops and events, and coincide with the relevant timelines of the SHARP/3RP and other coordination and appeal processes.

5.3 Efficiency

- 3. The NLG should continue to function as a secretariat and working group. It may consider opening this to qualified local NGOs and other local actors. The NLG should continue to include the UN agencies primarily responsible for coordinating the humanitarian response, e.g. both UNHCR and OCHA.** (EQ 3.1; Section 3.3.1.)

It will be especially important to include OCHA whose overall coordination role can be enhanced by cross-sector activities and a focus on integrated programming, as that offered by the NLG. To avoid split decisions, the NLG may have two UN organisations, e.g. UNICEF and OCHA, two INGOs, and at least one local actor. While this broadens the composition of the secretariat, with increased focus and a tiered approach to partnership, this should represent an effective operating model going forward.

- 4. A revised operating model and focus should be supported through predictable funding for 3 – 5 years. Results and value should include an assessment of NLG solutions and how these are incorporated into programming.** (EQ 3.1; Section 3.3.1.)

This dedicated funding should cover the costs of ½ the co-lead staff costs (the other ½ covered by the co-lead organisations), support for other staff costs (coordinator, communications, data analysis around outcome monitoring, reporting, event facilitation planning, facilitation, and logistics, and administration, et. al.), budget to conduct four “innovation workshops” annually, following the model established by the NLG TechSummit, budget to maintain and expand the No Lost Generation initiative website so that it may serve both the Syria and Iraq crises but also other humanitarian responses, and travel and administrative costs. It is not within the purview of this evaluation to determine the precise costs and level of expertise required for these. However, the potential for the NLG to act as a catalyst for integrated programming that attend to the “whole child” and that informs all

relevant actors of the outcome-level results from such programming, will have a considerable return on any such investments.

- 5. The NLG should focus on identifying issues concerning integrated approaches that are appearing across country contexts and across multiple partners.** (EQ 3.5; Section 3.3.5.)

NLG partners at the regional level should then agree with their country offices as to which issues warrant being treated by the NLG, either as an operational research question or as an issue to be explored in “innovation workshops.”

5.4 Platform for Sharing Knowledge

- 6. The NLG should continue to invest in the No Lost Generation initiative website to highlight outcome level results, NLG developed solutions and innovations, and as a repository of knowledge for the region and for other humanitarian contexts.** (EQ 4.2; Section 3.4.1.)

While there are indications that the website has not been fully utilised, it’s value may expand as and if the NLG changes its approach. The website can be used to share outcome level results associated with integrated programming, something current HRPs do not adequately accomplish, and on emerging best practices. The website, along with other advocacy/communication materials, should focus on international actors, and primarily donors, as its audience. (See also Section 3.3.1 concerning investments in this area.)

5.5 Connectedness



- 7. The NLG may continue to make reference to output-level results across the pillars, as is done currently, but should expand upon these to identify and document outcome-level results that highlight the emerging or best practices in relation to child protection, education, and youth and adolescent programming, and how different organisations work together on these, or against one another, and how this supports outcome-level results.** (EQ 5.1; Section 3.5.1.)

6 ANNEX: Qualitative Evidence Graphs



The following sections include qualitative evidence graphs based on evidence collected during the field phase. This is organised by evaluation levels (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, platform for sharing knowledge, connectedness, and sustainability) and their corresponding evaluation questions.

6.1 Relevance (1.0)



Overall Relevance



1.2 To what extent did the NLG identify gaps to relevant actors at different times in the response?





1.4 How relevant is the NLG initiative to other humanitarian responses? Is there a model that could be used in other responses?





6.2 Effectiveness (2.0)



2.2 Did the expansion of NLG partners and working in partnership contribute to better results and/or constrain/complicate NLG activities and approaches?



2.3 How did the NLG provide insight to and otherwise support how actors respected the rights of the child, gender equality, and human rights-based approaches?





2.4 What were the major factors in each phase and at each level, that contributed to the achievements of the initiative's intents or hampered achieving of those intents?





6.3 Efficiency (3.0)



3.2 How efficient was the NLG Secretariat chaired by UNICEF? How efficient was the role of UNICEF as a lead?



3.4 At global and regional level - what were the advantages of agencies' collaboration as an NLG coalition, compared to individual agencies' responses to the crises as it affects children and young people in the affected countries - especially for advocacy and resource mobilization?





3.5 At country level: To what extent did being part of the initiative contribute to better programming for boys and girls in the programmatic areas under the three pillars, compared to other programmatic areas?





6.4 Platform for sharing knowledge (4.0)

4.1 To what extent did the NLG initiative contribute to fostering synergies and avoiding overlaps/incoherent approaches between different sectors and partners?





4.4 To what extent was the NLG initiative's implementation coordinated with other relevant initiatives at all levels, such as Whole of Syria Forum for example? Are there any overlaps or existing gaps?





6.5 Connectedness (5.0)

5.2 How did the NLG consider both the short-term emergency needs of children, youth, and adolescents as well as longer-term programming and development needs in these areas at the country level? Did it influence different actors to consider the short- and long-term needs of children, youth and adolescents?



5.3 How, if, and when did the NLG make links to country, regional, and international forums related to education, child protection, and youth and adolescent programming? Were possible links missed and, if so, what was the consequence of such missed opportunities?



7 ANNEX: Evaluation Survey Results

The following sections include the results from the Evaluation’s survey.


64 respondents completed the survey. The survey is designed to get a “snap shot” of key issues rather than being a conclusive data set in and of itself.

Respondents ranked each question on a scale of 1 – 4:


1--Not at all **2-- Somewhat** **3 --Significantly** **4—Completely**

7.1 Relevance

Did the NLG identify gaps in education, child protection, and youth/adolescent programming to relevant actors? (1.2)




σ^2 (0.38)




σ^2 (0.70)

Is the NLG aligned with the human rights of children and young people - girls and boys -affected by the Syria and Iraq crises? (1.1)




σ^2 (0.70)




σ^2 (0.34)

Is the NLG relevant or a model for other humanitarian responses? (1.3)




σ^2 (0.42)




σ^2 (0.78)

7.2 Effectiveness

Has the NLG influenced policy/legal framework changes in the affected countries to develop a protective and more enabling environment for children and youth? (2.1)




σ^2 (0.62)




σ^2 (0.87)

Has the NLG influenced Increasing funding levels for education, child protection, and youth/adolescent programming? (2.1)




σ^2 (0.84)




σ^2 (0.64)

Has the NLG influenced the scope of education, child protection, and youth/adolescent programming? (2.1)




σ^2 (0.51)




σ^2 (0.69)

Has the NLG influenced the quality of education, child protection, and youth/adolescent programming? (2.1)




σ^2 (0.71)




σ^2 (0.85)

7.3 Efficiency

Considering the scope, objectives and composition of the NLG, was the chosen operational model the best fit to achieve influence and change? (3.1)




σ^2 (0.85)




σ^2 (0.69)

Was the NLG Secretariat chaired by UNICEF efficiently managed? (3.2)




σ^2 (0.65)




σ^2 (0.66)

7.4 Coordination

Did the NLG initiative foster synergies and avoid overlaps/incoherent approaches between different sectors and partners? (4.1)




σ^2 (0.50)




σ^2 (0.82)

7.5 Connectedness

Did the NLG make links to regional and international forums related to education, child protection, and youth and adolescent programming? (5.3)




σ^2 (0.72)




σ^2 (0.46)

Did the NLG influence different actors to consider the short- and long-term needs of children, youth and adolescents? (humanitarian/development nexus) (5.2)



σ^2 (0.45)



σ^2 (0.55)

8 ANNEX: Terms of Reference

Available as a separate *Annex*.

9 ANNEX: Inception Phase Report

Available as a separate *Annex*.

10 ANNEX: Evaluation Questions

The following table includes the evaluation questions agreed upon during the Inception Phase.

1.0 Relevance
1.1 How aligned are the stated or apparent intentions of the NLG multi-agency, multi-country and multi-sector initiative with the human rights of children and young people - girls and boys -affected by the Syria and Iraq crises?
1.2 To what extent did the NLG identify gaps to relevant actors at different times in the response?
1.3 How far are the stated or apparent intentions of the NLG initiative aligned with partners' strategic objectives?
1.4 How relevant is the NLG initiative to other humanitarian responses? Is there a model that could be used in other responses?
2.0 Effectiveness
2.1 To what extent have the commitments, intended results, and/or articulated targets mentioned in the NLG vision and strategic documents been achieved in regard to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Policy/legal framework changes in the affected countries to develop a protective and more enabling environment for children and youth; ○ Increasing funding levels for No Lost Generation programming over time; ○ Scope and quality of the humanitarian response under No Lost Generation pillars in No Lost Generation countries and reaching the most vulnerable boys and girls with appropriate access to formal and non-formal learning opportunities, access to protective environment, broadening opportunities for adolescents and youth, and the intersection between these pillars?
2.2 To what extent did the NLG expand the number and type of actors it was influencing/changing? Did this contribute to better results and/or constrain/complicate NLG activities and approaches?
2.3 How did the NLG provide insight to and otherwise support how actors respect the rights of the child, gender equality, and human rights-based approaches?
2.4 What were the major factors in each phase and at each level, that contributed to the achievements of the initiative's intents or hampered achieving of those intents?
3.0 Efficiency
3.1 Considering the scope, objectives and composition of the NLG, was the chosen operational model the best fit to achieve influence and change?
3.2 How efficient was the NLG Secretariat chaired by UNICEF? What were the dedicated resources by the various agencies - members of the Secretariat? How efficient was the role of UNICEF as a lead? In what ways, could that role be made more efficient?
3.3 Were efficiencies of scale reached by having a common framework (e.g. how much resources-human and financial- were put into NLG-specific activities and what were the immediate results from them)?
3.4 At global and regional level - what were the advantages of agencies' collaboration as an NLG coalition, compared to individual agencies' responses to the crises as it affects children and young people in the affected countries - especially for advocacy and resource mobilization?
3.5 At country level: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ To what extent did being part of the initiative contribute to better programming and faster delivering of services to boys and girls in the programmatic areas under the three pillars, compared to other programmatic areas? ○ To what extent did NLG implementation promote synergy and facilitate cross-learning across the covered programmatic sectors?
3.6 Did the NLG have sufficient human and financial resources to capitalise upon opportunities as they arose?
3.7 What is the value, in fiscal terms, of different aspects of NLG's work? How should one consider the "return on investment" associated with such an approach?
4.0 Platform for sharing knowledge
4.1 To what extent did the NLG initiative contribute to fostering synergies and avoiding overlaps/incoherent approaches between different sectors and partners?
4.2 What is the value added of the coordination mechanism?
4.3 At country level - were there any NLG coordination mechanisms and if so - how efficiently did they work? If not - why not?
4.4 To what extent was the NLG initiative's implementation coordinated with other relevant initiatives at all levels, such as Whole of Syria Forum for example? Are there any overlaps or existing gaps?
5.0 Connectedness
5.1 How does the NLG initiative relate to UNICEF's Gender Action Plan (GAP and other frameworks related to gender equality and human rights-based approaches?
5.2 How did the NLG consider both the short-term emergency needs of children, youth, and adolescents as well as longer-term programming and development needs in these areas at the country level? Did it influence different actors to consider the short and long term needs of children, youth and adolescents?

5.3 How, if, and when did the NLG make links to country, regional, and international forums related to education, child protection, and youth and adolescent programming? Were possible links missed and, if so, what was the consequence of such missed opportunities?
6.0 Intended and unintended results (potential impact)
6.1 Is there evidence that NLG initiative contributed to increased funding, accelerated programming and scaled-up programme interventions in the three programmatic areas, in response to the Syrian and Iraqi crises?
6.2 What changes, relevant to children and young people affected by the conflict, does NLG initiative appear to have contributed to?
6.3 Were there any unintended positive or negative effects of the initiative, either on the response to the Syria and Iraq crises at country level or on NLG partners at global and regional level, and if so what were these? (potential impact)
7.0 Sustainability
7.1 What measures have been built into the initiative at national and regional level to sustain any positive elements, including emerging positive outcomes of NLG, and how could these be strengthened?
7.2 In the participating countries, to what extent did NLG contribute to (or impeded) transition to sustainable long-term solutions to meeting the educational, protection and participation needs of children and youth?
7.3 Could other locations/countries/regions benefit from an extension, replication, or modification of NLG, and if so, what are proposed modalities for doing so?

11 ANNEX: Survey & Semi-Structured Interview Protocols

Name: (OPTIONAL)

Title: (OPTIONAL)

Organisation:

Time/Date:

Informed Consent (To be read aloud to participant immediately after introductions.)

“The overall purpose of this evaluation is to assess how and if the No Lost Generation (NLG) initiative influenced different actors to deliver more and better education, child protection, and youth and adolescent programming for children and youth affected by the Syria crisis. Your insights and comments are important for establishing whether there are trends across different respondents concerning key questions about the NLG.

We never quote anyone or provide other direct attribution in any report, presentation, or any other materials, without the prior written consent of the person(s) involved. We cannot absolutely guaranty confidentiality as one may draw correlations from the evaluation to different people. We are required to report any abuse or severe neglect.

Your participation is voluntary, and you are welcome to respond or not respond to any question or to end the interview at any time. We accept any decision along these lines; it will have no penalty or loss for you. Conversely, there are no risks or possible benefits associated with your involvement in this interview.

We expect the entire interview to take no more than 1 hour to conduct the survey, answer formal questions, and address any other issues you may deem relevant. We will describe the process and reporting timeline at the end of the conversation as well as to answer any questions that you may have.

If you have any questions about the evaluation, please contact Robert Stryck at rstryck@unicef.org.

Overview of NLG (Will be described in more detail upon informed consent.)


In 2018, the NLG included five objectives:

- ✓ Positive and lasting changes for children and young people in No Lost Generation countries are supported as a result of regional-level strategic efforts to influence decision-makers towards No Lost Generation advocacy objectives. (advocacy)
- ✓ The funding level for programmes under No Lost Generation pillars in each of the 6 No Lost Generation countries is at least 60% of appeal target. (fundraising / accountability)
- ✓ Programmatic responses at country level have been strengthened as a result of regional level strategic direction-setting and knowledge management for cross sector programmes, emerging areas and innovations (support for cross-sector programming, emerging programme areas and innovation)
- ✓ The voices of children and youth in No Lost Generation countries are raised at all levels through communications and participation in high level events. (ensuring the voices of children and young people are heard at all levels.)
- ✓ Country level practitioners in No Lost Generation programme areas have access to relevant resources and are guided by strategic frameworks for cross sector programmes, emerging programme areas and innovations (knowledge management; facilitation of partnerships and other support for cross-sector programming, emerging programme areas and innovation including technology)

Overview of Evaluation Approach

The evaluation is designed to test the following “theory”:

- ✓ **The NLG DID influence different actors to deliver more and better education, child protection, and youth and adolescent programming for children and youth affected by the Syria crisis.**



Field Schedule

25-Nov	26-Nov	27-Nov	28-Nov	29-Nov	30-Nov	01-Dec	03-Dec	04-Dec	05-Dec	06-Dec	07-Dec	08-Dec	10-Dec	11-Dec	12-Dec	13-Dec	14-Dec	15-Dec	17-Dec	18-Dec	19-Dec	20-Dec
Kick off meeting	Key Informant Interviews (5 * 3)	Key Informant Interviews (5 * 3)	Key Informant Interviews (5 * 3)	Preparation for D&A Workshop OR 5 * 2 more KI	Team to Beirut (Martina & Douaa)	Data Review & Organization	Kick off meeting	Key Informant Interviews (5 * 2)	Key Informant Interviews (5 * 2)	Key Informant Interviews (5 * 2)	Key Informant Interviews (5 * 2)	Data Review & Organization	Preparation for D&A Workshop	Kick off meeting	Key Informant Interviews (5)	Key Informant Interviews (5)	Key Informant Interviews (5)	Data Review & Organization	Key Informant Interviews (5)	Key Informant Interviews (2)	D&A Workshop (Turkey)	Preparation for D&A Workshop
Team Meeting				D&A Workshop (OPTION I)			Key Informant Interviews (3)						D&A Workshop (Lebanon)	Key Informant Interviews (3)						Preparation for D&A Workshop	D&A Workshop (Jordan) OPTION II	
Jordan						Lebanon						Turkey										
* 65 - 70 key informant interviews for Jordan						43 interviews						25 interviews										

Key Dates in Evaluation Process

- ✓ **Draft report**, including case studies/without recommendations. (13 January)
- ✓ Presentation of preliminary findings to the Steering Committee (online/skype)
- ✓ Revise draft Evaluation Report
- ✓ **Revised evaluation report**, including recommendations (7 February)
- ✓ Review of second draft report by the SC
- ✓ Presentation of conclusions and recommendations (Amman; via videoconference)
- ✓ **Final Report** (28 February)

Respondent's Questions

Would you like to make any comments, or do you have any questions before we begin?

Survey

We invite you to answer the following questions on a scale of 1 - 4. The survey is designed to get a “snap shot” of key issues before more detailed discussions. (References to specific evaluation questions are included.)

1--Not at all 2-- Somewhat 3 --Significantly 4—Completely Don't Know (DK)

1 2 3 4

Relevance

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. Did the NLG identify gaps in education, child protection, and youth/adolescent programming to relevant actors? (1.2) | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 2. Is the NLG aligned with the human rights of children and young people - girls and boys -affected by the Syria and Iraq crises?? (1.1) | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 3. Is the NLG relevant or a model for other humanitarian responses? (1.3) | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> |

Effectiveness

- | | |
|--|---|
| 4. Has the NLG influenced policy/legal framework changes in the affected countries to develop a protective and more enabling environment for children and youth? (2.1) | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 5. Has the NLG influenced Increasing funding levels for education, child protection, and youth/adolescent programming? (2.1) | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 6. Has the NLG influenced the scope of education, child protection, and youth/adolescent programming? (2.1) | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 7. Has the NLG influenced the quality of education, child protection, and youth/adolescent programming? (2.1) | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> |

Efficiency

- | | |
|---|---|
| 8. Considering the scope, objectives and composition of the NLG, was the chosen operational model the best fit to achieve influence and change? (3.1) | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 9. Was the NLG Secretariat chaired by UNICEF efficiently managed? (3.2) | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> |

Coordination

- | | |
|--|---|
| 10. Did the NLG initiative foster synergies and avoid overlaps/incoherent approaches between different sectors and partners? (4.1) | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> |
|--|---|

Connectedness

- | | |
|---|---|
| 11. Did the NLG make links to regional and international forums related to education, child protection, and youth and adolescent programming? (5.3) | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 12. Did the NLG influence different actors to consider the short and long term needs of children, youth and adolescents? (humanitarian/development nexus) (5.2) | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> |

Thank you for taking this brief survey. As mentioned, this is a simple way to get a sense of the issues under review. We are grateful for your input.

Qualitative Evidence

As a primary means for collecting qualitative evidence, the evaluation team will ask standard questions of all respondents. We do this to examine patterns across different groups of respondents rather than being overly biased by the responses of any single respondent.

In practice, the interview will focus on 1 or 2 questions per evaluation criteria. These will be selected as based on the respondents' roles and responsibilities. Questions may be also tailored for specific respondents. Specific examples will be elicited as often as possible. References to specific evaluation questions are included.

As noted in the analytical framework, some questions are meant to be exploratory and/or to solicit examples of best/emerging practices or challenges. Others are specific to our Qualitative Data Trend Analysis, the latter of which are identified by an “”.*

Overall

- 1. Please describe your role and the primary aspects of your work that relate the NLG initiative.**

Relevance

- 2. How aligned are the stated or apparent intentions of the NLG multi-agency, multi-country and multi-sector initiative with the human rights of children and young people - girls and boys -affected by the Syria and Iraq crises? (1.1)**
- 3. To what extent did the NLG identify gaps to relevant actors at different times in the response? (1.2) ***
- 4. How relevant is the NLG initiative to other humanitarian responses? (1.4)**

Effectiveness

- 5. Describe how the NLG has achieved: (2.1)**
 - ✓ Policy/legal framework changes in the affected countries to develop a protective and more enabling environment for children and youth;
 - ✓ Increasing funding levels for No Lost Generation programming over time;
 - ✓ Scope and quality of the humanitarian response under No Lost Generation pillars in No Lost Generation countries and reaching the most vulnerable boys and girls with appropriate access to formal and non-formal learning opportunities, access to protective environment, broadening opportunities for adolescents and youth, and the intersection between these pillars?
- 6. How, if at all, did working in the NLG partnership contribute to better results and/or constrain/complicate NLG activities and approaches? (2.2) ***
- 7. How, if at all did the NLG influence actors to abide by the rights of the child, gender equality, and human rights-based approaches? (2.3) ***
- 8. What were the major factors that contributed to the achievements of NLG's intents or hampered achieving of those intents? (2.4)**
- 9. What else contributed to or constrained the NLG's effectiveness?**

Partnership

- 10. To what extent did being part of the initiative contribute to better programming and faster delivering of services to boys and girls in the programmatic areas under the three pillars, compared to other programmatic areas? (3.5) ***
- 11. At global and regional level, what were the advantages of an NLG coalition, especially for advocacy and resource mobilization? (3.4) ***
- 12. How efficient was the NLG Secretariat chaired by UNICEF? How efficient was the role of UNICEF as a lead? In what ways, could that role be made more efficient? (3.2) ***

Coordination

13. To what extent did the NLG initiative contribute to foster synergies and avoid overlaps/incoherent approaches between different sectors and partners? (4.1) *
14. What is the value added of the coordination mechanism? (4.2) *
15. To what extent was the NLG initiative's implementation coordinated with other relevant initiatives at all levels, such as Whole of Syria Forum for example? Are there any overlaps or existing gaps? (4.4) *

Connectedness

16. How did the NLG consider both the short-term emergency needs of children, youth, and adolescents as well as longer-term programming and development needs in these areas at the country level? Did it influence different actors to consider the short and long term needs of children, youth and adolescents? (5.2) *
17. How, if, and when did the NLG make links to regional and international forums related to education, child protection, and youth and adolescent programming? Were possible links missed and, if so, what was the consequence of such missed opportunities? (5.3) *

Efficiency

18. Did the NLG contribute to more efficient ways of working between and beyond partners? Please provide some examples. (3.3)
19. Did the NLG facilitate efficiencies of scale by having a common framework? (3.3)

Potential Impact

20. Were there any unintended positive or negative effects of the initiative, either on the response to the Syria and Iraq crises at country level or on NLG partners at global and regional level, and if so what were these? (6.3)

Exploratory Questions

The evaluation team will then ask any follow-up questions where additional detail or more clarity would be useful.

Closing

21. *Is there anything we haven't discussed that you expected we would discuss? Any other points you'd like to raise?*
22. *What are your expectations for this evaluation?*
23. *Do you have questions you would like to ask me?*
24. *Follow-up on any documentation or evidentiary sources that could be helpful for evaluation.*
25. *Describe process: Once the review team's field visits are completed, we will hold an informal workshop where the team presents what it has learned and asks partners to provide feedback and clarification.*

Thank you.

12 ANNEX: Convention on the Rights of the Child⁶³

Articles specifically related to education:

Article 28

1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to education, and with a view to achieving this right progressively and on the basis of equal opportunity, they shall, in particular:

- (a) Make primary education compulsory and available free to all;
- (b) Encourage the development of different forms of secondary education, including general and vocational education, make them available and accessible to every child, and take appropriate measures such as the introduction of free education and offering financial assistance in case of need;
- (c) Make higher education accessible to all on the basis of capacity by every appropriate means;
- (d) Make educational and vocational information and guidance available and accessible to all children;
- (e) Take measures to encourage regular attendance at schools and the reduction of drop-out rates.

2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that school discipline is administered in a manner consistent with the child's human dignity and in conformity with the present Convention.

3. States Parties shall promote and encourage international cooperation in matters relating to education, in particular with a view to contributing to the elimination of ignorance and illiteracy throughout the world and facilitating access to scientific and technical knowledge and modern teaching methods. In this regard, particular account shall be taken of the needs of developing countries.

Article 29

1. States Parties agree that the education of the child shall be directed to:

- (a) The development of the child's personality, talents and mental and physical abilities to their fullest potential;
- (b) The development of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and for the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations;
- (c) The development of respect for the child's parents, his or her own cultural identity, language and values, for the national values of the country in which the child is living, the country from which he or she may originate, and for civilizations different from his or her own;
- (d) The preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society, in the spirit of understanding, peace, tolerance, equality of sexes, and friendship among all peoples, ethnic, national and religious groups and persons of indigenous origin;
- (e) The development of respect for the natural environment.

2. No part of the present article or article 28 shall be construed so as to interfere with the liberty of individuals and bodies to establish and direct educational institutions, subject always to the observance of the principle set forth in paragraph 1 of the present article and to the requirements that the education given in such institutions shall conform to such minimum standards as may be laid down by the State.

⁶³ "Convention on the Rights of the Child." Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989 entry into force 2 September 1990, in accordance with article 49.

13 ANNEX: NLG Events Direct Costs Table

The following table was provided by the NLG and includes all event and associated costs between 2016 and 2019.

Date	Event	Location	Lead agency	estimated cost in USD
25-Jun-19	NLG Tech Summit 2019: Connecting Learning to Earning	Amman, Jordan	UNICEF	\$180,000
22-Apr-19	Donor Briefing on Participatory Action Research: A Dialogue with Young Researchers from the MENA Region	Amman, Jordan	UNICEF	\$400
12-Mar-19	Third Brussels Conference on Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region	Belgium, Brussels	UNICEF	\$1,400
4-Dec-18	INTERAGENCY SYRIA CRISIS CHILD PROTECTION REGIONAL WORKSHOP FOR WoS and 3RP COUNTRIES	Amman, Jordan	UNICEF	\$25,000
15-Oct-18	2018 Round table for Child Protection in Humanitarian Action and Education in Emergencies	Nairobi, Kenya	WVI	\$0
26-Sep-18	Regional Level No Lost Generation Donor Briefing On Adolescents and Youth 2018	Beirut, Lebanon	UNICEF / UNHCR	\$7,000
25-Sep-18	NLG evidence symposium 2018	Beirut, Lebanon	UNICEF	\$140,000
20-Sep-18	No Lost Generation Tech Task Force webinar Signpost: One-Stop Informational Portal for Crisis-Affected Individuals	Online	Nethope	\$0
21-Jun-18	Scaling what works: innovative approaches to education in emergencies	New York, USA	Nethope	\$0
5-Jun-18	NLG Tech Task Force at the World Refugee Council workshop	California, USA	?	\$0
9-May-18	No Lost Generation donor briefing and round-table discussion on Gender Based Violence against adolescent girls and boys	Amman, Jordan	UNICEF	\$0
24-Apr-18	Second Brussels Conference on Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region	Brussels, Belgium	UNICEF	\$2,000
15-Mar-18	Education donor and partner briefing	Amman, Jordan	UNICEF	\$400
13-Mar-18	37th session of Human Rights Council: High-level panel discussion on violations of the human rights of children in Syria	Geneva, Switzerland	UNHCR	\$0
7-Mar-18	Adobe Project 1324 Challenge: Expanding Participation for Conflict-Affected Youth	Online Webinar	Nethope	\$0
21-Feb-18	2018 NLG Tech Summit	Amman, Jordan	WVI	\$60,000
8-Feb-18	NLG Tech Task Force Webinar	Amman, Jordan	Nethope	\$0
Sep, 2017	Tech Task Force: Adolescents and Youth	San Francisco, US	WVI / Nethope	\$8,000
Sep, 2017	side-event: 72nd UN General Assembly	New York, USA	Nethope	\$60,000

Apr, 2017	Brussels Conference	Brussels, Belgium	UNICEF	\$1,000
Mar, 2017	No Lost Generation Ed Tech Summit	Amman, Jordan	UNICEF	\$40,000
Mar, 2017	Mashreq committee of the EU Parliament		WVI	\$1,200
Jan, 2017	Helsinki conference	Helsinki, Finland	UNICEF	\$2,500
2017	donor briefing	Hosted by Canada	Mercy Corps	\$0
December, 2016	UNHCR High Commissioner's Dialogue 2016	Geneva, Switzerland	UNHCR	\$0
May, 2016	World Humanitarian Summit	<u>Istanbul, Turkey</u>	UNICEF	\$4,500
2016	donor briefing	Amman, Jordan	UNICEF	\$0

14 ANNEX: Bibliography

UNICEF and the NLG provided a drive with a breadth of documentation from 2013 – to 2018. This served as a primary resource for the Evaluation, along with other comparative evidence.

The following includes the list of documents cited in this report.

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